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Due to the growing concerns with climate change and energy supply, Energy 
Performance Contracting (EPC), which uses the guaranteed future utility savings to 
repay the initial renovation investments, becomes increasingly popular. However, 
most Energy Service Companies (ESCOs) set the savings guarantee roughly based on 
their previous experience, which leads to inaccurate estimates in practice. This paper 
has built the stochastic models for the savings risks both from the energy price 
volatility and the facility performance instability, which follow the Geometric 
Brownian Motions (GBM) and Ito’s lemma. Then, a flexible guarantee designing 
method for ESCOs is developed to minimize the financial risks and a case study has 
been conducted to show the application. Finally, suggestions have been made for how 
ESCOs set the guarantee and the extra profit sharing proportion in contracts based on 
the existing information. This method will help them appropriately allocate risks with 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
Climate change and energy supply concerns, volatile and increasing energy prices, and a desire 
for greater energy independence have led many state and national leaders to support an 
increasingly prominent role for energy efficiency in energy policy. Currently, it has become one 
of the quickest and cheapest ways to increase the amount of energy available for use. There are 
numerous advantages of energy efficiency improvements, such as the psychological benefits of 
using natural lighting sources, which not only makes the home or office more comfortable, but 
also increases worker productivity or enables a retail store to be more appealing to clients, 
healthier, better-ventilated buildings, food that stays fresher in more efficient refrigerators and 
motors that run quieter, etc. Energy efficiency also offers a significant opportunity to mitigate the 
potential climate change by using less energy, which reduces emission of carbon dioxide, air-
borne mercury, and other harmful pollutants from power plants that burn fewer fossil fuels to 
meet the lower energy demand (Granade et al., 2009). McKinsey & Company asserts that energy 
efficiency offers a vast, low-cost energy resource for the U.S. economy with profitable potential 
savings by 2020 totaling 23% of U.S. energy projected demand, worth over $1.2 trillion but 
costing less than a half.  
 
As the most important sector compared with industry and transportation, making buildings more 
energy efficient has been identified as a largely untapped solution to address climate change, 
energy security and fossil fuel depletion. However, most clients are risk-avoided who lack the 
building energy-efficient renovation and operation experience. It also takes time and efforts to 
arrange the up-front capital cost or to get special congressional appropriations. Therefore, 
projects are quite possibly delayed or under consideration, though facility managers are often 
faced with building equipment crises such as the imminent demise of a boiler plant or an air 
conditioner. Energy efficiency needs a more cost-effective route to overcome those barriers and 





The energy performance contacting (EPC) market has several major drivers, such as savings 
mandates, facility modernization, green buildings and climate change. (ICF & NAESCO, 2007). 
Not only being amiable to the environment, EPC is a kind of win-win service for both the clients 
and the ESCOs. EPC allows facility owners and managers to upgrade ageing and inefficient 
assets while recovering capital required for the upgrade directly from the energy savings 
guaranteed by the ESCO. It helps to meet the energy reduction and environmental goals, at the 
same time, improves utility facilities to be more comfortable and reliable. At the end of the 
specific contract period the full benefits of the cost savings revert to the facility owner. From the 
clients’ perspectives, EPC saves money and avoids the cost of delay and inaction as well as 
deferred maintenance. On the other hand, it creates incentives for the ESCO to provide high 
quality products and services that will perform long after installation and commission well. They 
get the motivation to find all energy conservation measures (ECMs) and commit to do all punch 
list items timely. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
 
The U.S. ESCO market has shifted away from the “shared savings” to the “guaranteed savings” 
type contracts over the last 15 years and 86% of the performance-based projects have specified 
guarantee in their contracts (Goldman et al., 2005). Under a shared savings contract, savings are 
split in accordance with a pre-arranged percentage: there is no ‘standard’ split that it depends on 
the cost of the project, the length of the contract and the risks taken by the ESCOs and the client. 
This mode limits long-term market growth and competition between the ESCOs and between 
financing institutions. For instance, small or new ESCOs with no previous experience in 
borrowing and few own resources are unlikely to get financing if such agreements dominate. 
 
A scheme where an ESCO promises a certain level of energy savings and in this way shields the 
client from any performance risk is known as guaranteed savings. The guarantee for the savings 
that is produced by the project will be sufficient to cover the cost of financing for the life of the 
project. On Honeywell’s website, savings guarantee has been explained as “if the new energy 




the guarantee are the client’s to keep.” Danfoss has also said “if we promise to save you 1 
million EUR in an energy performance project and only manage to save you 800,000 EUR, we 
pay you the 200,000 EUR difference. If we find more, we split the over-performance, usually 50-
50.” 
 
Both the ESCOs and the clients consider the savings revenue risk an important factor when they 
assess an energy performance project’s feasibility due to the volatile energy prices and high 
technical instability. In most EPC cases, the ESCOs promise a minimum amount of energy-
saving revenue and take on the entire risks related to the provision of energy services, including 
equipment-performance risks, energy-price risks and credit risks. The form of the guarantees 
varies between projects because the guarantees are designed to fit the requirements of particular 
clients, as well as federal and state legislation and regulations. Clients can also choose to be 
directly financed by banks or by a financing agency and then repay the loan themselves, most of 
those public sectors such as federal and MUSH market that can get better interest rates than the 
ESCOs. In that case, certain credit risks have been transferred to the ESCOs through the 
performance guarantee. 
 
However, many deficiencies have still existed in the current guarantees setting. Most ESCOs 
guarantee the certain amount of energy savings that the project will deliver based on their 
historical experience without systematic estimation method. Due to the potential low-
performance and loss risks, the ESCOs virtually never guarantee 100% of predicted savings and 
there is always a difference between the predicted and guaranteed savings amounts. Due to Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory research of 2007, there are only 12% of the projects that the reported 
annual cost savings that were equal to the guaranteed cost savings, suggesting that all of the 
savings in these projects were stipulated. On average, the ESCOs guarantee about 91% of the 
estimated cost savings and projects reports achieve about 99% of the predicted cost savings. In 
other words, the projects report 108% of their guaranteed cost savings in general and the average 






Most of the time, clients award these "umbrella" contracts to the ESCOs based on their ability to 
meet the terms and conditions. From the clients’ perspectives, an energy savings guarantee 
should be expected the higher the better. So, making conservative guarantees surely decreases 
the potential loss risks but at the same time also reduces the chances for the ESCOs to win the 
competitive bid. The objectively existed trade-off point for the ESCOs is hard to estimate and 
adjust, but it is critical and of great importance to pay further attention. Also, the contract clauses 
specifying how to share the exceeding verified profit between the ESCOs and the clients above 
the fixed-price guarantee are often blurred or ignored by both the ESCOs and clients in practice. 
Its potential risk adjusted function has not been taken consideration yet. Having a better 
understanding on the potential benefit sharing could not only give the clients a great reference on 
the optimal EPC bidder selection, future schedule and budget arrangements, but also helps the 
ESCOs reasonably allocate the estimated financial risks with successful contract negotiation.  
 
1.3 Research Objectives 
To supplement those deficiencies mentioned above, this thesis aims to explore methods that 
design more flexible and affordable revenue risk mitigation guarantees in EPC contracts. Goals 
of the thesis research contribute to: 
 
1. Identifying the uncertainties of the framework and stochastic processes for the energy savings 
guarantee setting. 
Framing the process within the context of a real-options paradigm based on the overall 
identification is the first step in conducting the guarantee design research. Here, we consider the 
predicted energy savings as the underlying asset in an option contract, taking into account that, 
when a nonfinancial asset is used, some adjustments have to be made to the options approach. 
The inner energy saving relations are among predicted, verified and guaranteed, which are all 
based on the corresponding ECMs that have been selected for adoption into the EPC contract 
before project implementation. Most of the time, there is a difference between the predicted and 
verified energy savings since the technologies performance and the energy price never stay 




as the stochastic process to represent the annual energy savings evolution in this thesis and the 
resulting stochastic energy saving model will have a probability distribution of values. 
 
2. Explaining the causations for general energy consumption volatility and giving corresponding 
estimation. 
Volatility is one of the most difficult input parameters to estimate in real options analysis. Real 
options analysis asks the volatility estimate to be yearly based. Also, considering the seasonal 
energy consumption differences and measurement convenience, annualized volatility is the ideal 
parameter we are looking for. Volatility causations for EPC energy savings mainly come from 
both the energy price change and the facility performance instability. There are a number of 
ways to model volatility changes. To simplify the model, we assume a constant volatility in our 
model design. Based on the Ito’s Lemma, we decompose the general energy consumption 
volatility into recognized utility price and quantity volatility. Typically, the portfolio energy 
price volatility can be obtained through historical data. The Monte Carlo simulation is also 
conducted to generate the related performance data for guarantee design with certain subjective 
distribution and boundaries. 
 
3. Exploring the inner relations between the guarantee and the exceeding profit sharing with 
sensitivity analysis. 
Based on the stochastic process framed and the energy savings volatility identified, the amount 
of energy savings guarantee specified in the contract has very tight relations with the proportion 
of excess profit sharing that tradeoffs the guarantee with flexibility. The annual energy savings 
guaranteed by the ESCO as part of a performance contract may cover the energy savings risks 
partially or totally, which provides both the ESCOs and the clients the opportunity to participate 
in revenue risk coverage. In this setting, we assume the amount of potential excess energy 
savings traded off equals the fair price of the potential savings shortage risk coverage. By tracing 
back to the existing guarantee price, we can change it by a preset amount and see the effect on 
the resulting exceeding profit sharing proportion and finally draw the indifference curve to find 





4. Assisting the ESCOs and the clients to develop effective risk mitigation methods and optimal 
guarantee strategies. 
In this thesis, we develop a methodology to value these guarantee clauses of energy performance 
contracting and, for that purpose, broadens the value generation parameters by adding the 
exceeding profit sharing into consideration, which increases the flexibility at the same time that 
it decreases the uncertainty. This methodology is applied to those EPC cases that have already 
finished the feasibility analysis but without making the guarantee contract yet, which helps the 
ESCOs obtain more profit from the service and, at the same time, improve the satisfaction of 
clients so that loyalty is improved. The flexibility added in makes the contract more affordable, 
necessary to the good management and exploitation of the value from uncertainty and volatility.  
 
1.4 Organization of Thesis 
The study is structured according to the following sequential process that presents a novel 
valuation framework which supports developing optimal energy savings risk mitigation contracts 
with more flexibility as Figure 1 showing below.  
 
1. Problem formation  
Problem identification marks the first phase of the study which plays a critical role to recognize 
where improvements could be conducted for further analysis. Chapter 1, Introduction, introduces 
the energy efficiency background and identifies the significance for buildings’ energy renovation. 
This kind of energy performance contracting (EPC) win-win mode helps the risk-avoided clients 
take charge of the large initial capital investment for the project construction and installation. 
However, the annual guaranteed energy savings specified in the contract, which helps cover the 
increasing energy price rate and the deficient energy performance risk, are usually under- or 
over-estimated. More flexible and applicable risk mitigation methodologies in the EPC guarantee 
contract are needed to motivate both the clients and the ESCOs’ cooperation for projects success. 
 
2. Literature review 
Once the scope of the research is established, a thorough literature review is needed in order to 




needed. In this study, to have a thorough understanding of the popular general EPC process and 
to recognize the critical factors within the annual energy savings guarantee are what we would 
like to know through the literature review. Also we would like to learn the current development 
of the real option application which is the risk evaluation method we prefer to use in this study in 
order to help us make comparison and improvement on our model. Chapter 2, Literature Review, 
summarizes the existing research regarding the EPC state of practice such as its historical 
development, the project types, etc., with emphasis on the EPC financial risk allocation. Related 
option theories are also reviewed from the aspects of real option theory and its application.  
 
3. Theoretical framework 
After the literature review, we would like to identify the available tools to achieve the research 
objectives as the stochastic modeling with the EPC risk variables building in. Chapter 3, Energy 
Savings Guarantee Design, introduces the general schemes to model flexible EPC guarantee 
contracts using the real options theory. It also presents the new family of stochastic models of 
EPC risk variables characterized by both the objective historical datasets and the subjective 
simulation datasets. The Monte-Carlo simulation and real option pricing techniques have also 
been applied so that the saving revenue guarantees, which the ESCOs promised in the contract, 
takes the form of European options combined with the absent revenue make-up and the excess 
benefit sharing. 
 
4. Case study 
In order to demonstrate the applicability of the real option model we proposed, a theoretical 
exercise, which involves a real EPC case, is developed considering an environment of current 
volatility and analyzing the opportunities the real options theory may grant. In Chapter 4, Case 
Study Analysis, the case study of the EPC implemented between the clients (the University of 
Maryland, College Park) and the ESCO (Johnson Controls) is discussed with data collected from 
both the project record, the historical reports and the simulation. The optimal strategies of pricing 
energy savings guarantee and proportioning additional profit sharing for the improvement of 
project contract clauses signed by both UMCP and Johnson Controls are also developed. 
 




Finally, the summarized conclusions of this study have been reached, and the considerations and 
suggestions for future research have also discussed. Based on the previous quantitative analysis, 
we can conclude that the real options analysis may be a viable and preferable alternative if 
compared to traditional methodologies, when used in an uncertain environment, in association 
with contract design flexibility. Further, research could work on the accuracy of the energy 
savings estimation and the volatility modeling. 
 
 




Chapter 2: Literature Review 
2.1 Introduction 
This section will review the past and current literatures that mainly cover the following two 
research threads: the EPC statement of practice and the development of the option theory. For the 
EPC review part, there are few journal articles focused in this area and the scientific reports from 
the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL) and the Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
(ORNL) are the main resources that we get the EPC background information from academic 
field. For the option theory review part, most articles are selected from the performance-based 
infrastructure area and similar guarantee clauses existing there. Reviewing what other scholars 
have found about EPC delivery method and option theory will help us to develop better models 
based on their findings.  
 
Before making any comments about EPCs, we need to have a general understanding of what 
EPCs are used in practice according to the prior research. The first phase of the literature review 
is aimed to identify the conceptual and financial issues associated with the EPC guarantees, 
which centers on EPC development and financing risk allocations. Like any other new contract 
mode, there are several critical parameters associated with EPC such as the utility price rate, the 
installed facility performance, the operation and maintenance cost savings, etc., as a result of the 
lengthy life cycle of the project, complex contracting mechanisms, a complex pool of finances, 
and multiple entities with different interests in a project. The EPCs review part talks about the 
importance of EPCs and presents a brief overview of the development followed by different time 
periods. It also covers the market and industry information related to EPCs, and defines some 
parameters which are popularly used in this project mode. Finally, it summarizes the existing 
varied risk allocation methods and emphasizes the importance of specified energy savings 
guarantee. 
 
In the other part, the option theory review embraces a comprehensive survey of past research on 
financial and real options theory with emphasis on the evaluation practice of guarantee specified 




tracking the special characteristics, such as the long performing period associated with the EPCs. 
Introducing the different attempts to the application of real options theory is also very important 
for us in understanding the potential effect of the risks in such kind of guarantees that have been 
covered in the contract. Financial option analysis, real options analysis and the evaluation 
practice in the guarantee are the three main parts for the second phase of this section.  
 
2.2 Energy Performance Contracting 
Energy efficiency of the building sector plays a vital role in reducing energy consumption. 
According to the U.S. DOE (2009), building-related energy consumption accounts for about 40% 
of total energy consumption in the United States, which serves the most important proportion 
compared with the sectors of industry and transportation as Figure 2 shows below. To aid in the 
process of energy efficiency improvement, a large private-sector energy-efficiency service 
industry has developed over the last two decades and the most commonly used contracting 
method adopted by these companies is Energy Performance Contracting (EPC) (Osborn et al., 
2002). 
 
Figure 2. Sectors Proportions of U.S. Primary Energy Consumption 





























Facility owners and operators know that energy costs are significant, and that these costs could 
be reduced by investing in proven and cost effective energy-saving technologies, systems and 
procedures. Yet they face a formidable number of barriers before investing in energy 
conservation. Some lack technical knowledge; others lack adequate finances, or are unable to 
raise sufficient finances; while others have reservations about the ability of energy-saving 
equipment to perform as promised (AEPCA, 2000). 
Energy Performance Contracting is a turnkey service that provides clients with a comprehensive 
set of energy efficiency, renewable energy and distributed generation measures and is often 
accompanied with guarantees that the savings produced by a project will be sufficient to finance 
the full cost of the project (ICF & NAESCO, 2007). New technologies implemented to reduce 
the energy consumption of a building are called energy conservation measures (ECMs), which 
include not only energy savings such as electricity, natural gas, fuel oil and water, but also O&M 
savings as well as other non-energy benefits, such as tariff changes resulting from fuel switching 
(Hopper et al., 2005). The Energy service companies (ESCOs) that provide the performance 
contracting services are seen as important vehicles around the world for promoting energy 
efficiency, especially in those countries experiencing increased competition and privatization in 
the electric utility business (Vine et al., 2003). Under a performance contract for energy saving, 
the ESCO examines a facility, evaluates the level of energy savings that could be achieved, and 
then offers to implement the project and guarantee those savings over an agreed term.  
 
2.2.1 The EPC Process 
 
According to the EPC guideline of the Australasian Energy Performance Contracting 
Association (AEPCA), the major steps towards implementing an EPC involve deciding whether 
or not to use energy performance contracting; determining whether there are energy saving 
opportunities worth pursuing and selecting a preferred supplier; developing and agreeing on the 





Figure 3. Flow Chart of Major Decision Steps towards an EPC 
(Source: A Best Practice Guide to Energy Performance Contracts by AEPCA, 2000). 
 
 
During the decision-making process, a public call for Expressions of Interest (EOI) is usually 
advertised in the local or national press. The EOI states the Client’s interest in entering into an 
EPC, with general details about the project scope and a request for respondents to describe how 
they would approach the work. An EPC implies a long-term financial relationship between the 
client and the ESCO. The financial stability of the ESCO is, therefore, a major consideration in 
evaluating proposals. A Detailed Facility Study (DFS) has been developed by the selected ESCO 
for the project scope specification, as well as the financial criteria such as Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR), Net Present Value (NPV), and minimum energy cost savings (AEPCA, 2000). Some 
common issues that might be the subject of negotiation include funding, maintenance, energy 
savings guarantee, baseline adjustment, and measurement and verification (M&V).  
 
2.2.2 State of the Practice 
 
The investment level of the ESCO projects continues to expand both because of the ESCO 
production input cost increases and client demand for more comprehensive mixes of 
technologies (Satchwell et al., 2010). ICF and NAESCO (2007) pointed out that the increasing 
and volatile energy prices, federal and state energy savings mandates, the continued lack of 
capital and maintenance budgets for federal facilities, and growing awareness of the need for 
large-scale action to limit greenhouse gas emissions are all factors that drive the EPC growth in 




over the last decades as summarized in Figure 3 with revenues increasing at a 24% annualized 
rate through 1990 to 2000 (Goldman et al., 2002), 20% per year between 2004 and 2006 (Hopper 
et al., 2007), 7% per year between 2006 and 2008, despite the onset of a severe economic 
recession and the average annual growth rate of 26% between 2009 and 2011 (Satchwell et al., 
2010).  
 
Figure 4. ESCO Industry Revenues Trends from 2007 to 2011 
 
(Source: A Survey of the U.S. ESCO Industry: Market Growth and Development from 2008 to 
2011 by Satchwell et al., 2010) 
ICF and NAESCO (2007) divided the history of the performance contracting industry into four 
stages:  
 
(1) The Beginning of DSM (Pre-1985). In the late 1970s and early 1980s, ESCOs were 
established to provide manpower and systems for enabling utilities to meet federal and state 
mandates and offer energy conservation services. Measurement and Verification (M&V) systems 
were also initially used to track the progress of first-generation utility DSM programs that tended 





(2) Emergence of EPC (1985-1993). Utility programs evolved from purchasing services (e.g., 
home energy audits) to acquiring large amounts of kW or kWh as part of their Integrated 
Resource Plans (IRPs) in the mid-1980s. ESCOs started to bid to provide the kW or kWh and 
delivered turnkey projects to large industrial and institutional clients and financed the projects 
themselves. At the same time, new types of M&V protocols were required to accurately measure 
the energy and demand savings produced by a project. ESCOs and clients struggled to develop 
replicable M&V systems for unfamiliar technologies, and often used “shared savings” contracts 
in which the ESCO was paid a share of project savings to mitigate perceived client risks.  
 
(3) Success and Consolidation (1994-2002). Commercial lenders jumped into the business, and 
quickly drove down the cost of project financing through competition and the development of 
new financing vehicles, such as low-cost municipal leases with ESCO savings guarantees. The 
advent of the International Performance Measurement and Verification Protocol (IPMVP) as 
well as the body of project savings histories, enabled the performance contracting business to 
enter a fast-growth stage in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Successful project experience proved 
to clients that EPC projects involved little technological risk, and the development of the IPMVP 
gave institutional financiers a standard method for validating project savings.  
 
(4) Pause and then Fast Growth (2003-Present). The collapse of Enron, the one-year sunset of the 
federal performance contracting program and the diminished prospects for the de-regulated retail 
energy business all combined to moderate ESCO growth from 2002 to 2004. The industry 
consolidated as many utilities folded up or sold their ESCOs. A new generation of M&V were 
also developed that validated new streams of EPC project value, such as operations and 
maintenance (O&M) savings, greenhouse gas reduction and electricity system capacity credits. 
 
Particularly, several key parameters need to be paid attention to in the EPC. Within the certain 
amount of energy cost savings that ESCOs guaranteed to be delivered by their EPC services, 
79.3% of the reported annual cost savings were due to reductions in utility bills and 20.7% were 
due to O&M or R&R savings with other economic benefits not directly tied to energy savings, 




typical duration of energy performance contracts is 10 years with 20% of projects completed in 
shorter than 5 years and 10% of projects with contract terms of 15 years or greater. (Goldman et 
al., 2005) Hughes et al. (2003) have selected sixteen characteristics to define a typical Super 
ESPC project, a special EPC service for government agencies, as time to award delivery order 
and complete construction, implementation price and financed amount, interest rate and contract 
term, etc. Detailed information is shown in Table 1 that data have been collected from the 
Federal Energy Management Program (FEMP) database through 71 delivery orders by the end of 
2001. 
 
Table 1. Financial Parameters for the Average Super ESPC  
 
1 Average time to DO award 15 months 
2 Average design/construction period 12 months 
3 Average implementation price $3,263,000  
4 Average financed amount $2,990,000  
5 Average per-performance-period payment $509,000  
6 Average financing procurement price $236,000  
7 Average project total annual interest rate 8.07% 
8 Average delivery order term 206 months 
9 Average first-year guaranteed cost savings $354,000  
10 Average escalation rate for guaranteed annual cost savings 1.87% 
11 Average first-year M&V price $13,300  
12 Average escalation rate for annual M&V price 3.78% 
13 Average first-year performance-period-services price, excluding M&V $36,400  
14 Average escalation rate for annual performance-period-services price, 
excluding M&V 
3.95% 
15 Average percentage of guaranteed cost savings paid to ESCO 98% 
16 Average escalation rate for annual contractor payment 1.87% 
 
(Source: Evaluation of Federal Energy Savings Performance Contracting: Methodology for Comparing 





2.2.3 Market Segments and Industry Structure 
 
Market activity continues to increase in both absolute and relative terms (Satchwell et al., 2010), 
though some industry observers believe the public/institutional market sectors may be 
approaching saturation, as first noted by Hopper et al. (2007). Considering EPC’s growing 
success  in  the  public  sector  and  escalating  energy  consumption  in  the private  building  
sector, the federal and state governments adopted EPC as the preferred method for producing 
energy efficiency improvements in large facilities. California and New York implemented 
standard performance contracting programs as the largest programs in their state energy 
efficiency program portfolios. (ICF & NAESCO, 2007)  
 
A breakdown of ESCO industry revenues among various client market segments according to the 
LBNL/NAESCO’s survey are represented in Figure 4 that compares U.S. ESCO industry 
revenues by various client market segments for 2006 and 2008. Since transaction costs in 
developing and implementing performance contracts are relatively high in the United States, the 
MUSH markets (municipal and state governments, universities and colleges, K-12 schools, and 
hospitals) have historically hosted the largest share of ESCO industry activity. (ICF and 
NAESCO, 2007) As a result, ESCOs continued to target the MUSH and the federal market in the 
United States, which accounted for 84% of ESCO revenues ($3.4 billion) in 2008 and was a 
slight increase from 2006 when 80% of ESCO revenues ($2.9 billion) were from projects in the 
public/institutional market sector. Commercial building and industrial projects were also active 
but have had more limited success in penetrating these markets, which comprised about 15% in 
2006 and 7% in 2008, compared to the remainder of the residential and public housing projects. 






Figure 5. ESCO Industry Revenues by Market Segment in 2006 and 2008 
 
(Source: A Survey of the U.S. ESCO Industry: Market Growth and Development from 2008 to 
2011 by Satchwell et al., 2010) 
 
State/local government projects are the most “typical” of all market segments since every 
performance indicator – costs, savings and economics – stays in the mid-range, compared to 
other public/institutional market segments. University/college campuses represent the largest 
facilities within the MUSH markets, and project investment per square foot is correspondingly 
low ($2.43/ft2 median). K-12 schools projects tend to have more challenging economics (the 
median payback time is 14.7 years) because they often leverage energy savings to pay for new 
energy and non-energy equipment. Hospital projects pay back the quickest (4.9 year median) and 
are cost-effective at more stringent evaluation criteria than other public/institutional market 
segments. (Hopper et al., 2005) 
 
ESCO industry is also characterized by a diversity of companies and could be dissected to 
examine trends in the ownership. Four categories have been classified for the ESCOs 
composition as independent ESCOs, building equipment manufacturers, utility companies and 
other energy/engineering companies such as international oil/gas companies, non-regulated 
energy suppliers, or large engineering firms, etc. (ICF and NAESCO, 2007) Figure 5 shows the 






Figure 6. Trends in ESCO Industry Shares by Company Ownership 
 
(Source: Introduction to Energy Performance Contracting by ICF & NAESCO, 2007) 
Independent ESCOs are numerous but relatively small in that 61% of companies comprised only 
21% of revenues in 2006. Building equipment and controls manufacturers have remained fairly 
constant in terms of number of companies from 15% in 2000 to 15% in 2006, but their share of 
industry revenues has increased substantially, from 27% in 2000 to 59% in 2006. The number of 
utility-owned ESCOs has declined from 35% in 2000 to only 15% in 2006 since they focus more 
on core regulated businesses or developing power generation, rather than retail energy services 
or power marketing. The share of companies owned by oil and gas companies, unregulated 
electric or gas suppliers, or large engineering companies has increased from 6% in 2000 to 9% in 
2006. But, their revenue share has decreased substantially from 24% to 10% attributable to the 
Enron bankruptcy. (ICF and NAESCO, 2007) 
 
2.2.4 Financial Risk Allocation 
 
Energy Performance Contracting is results-driven ensuring quality of performance, which differs 
from traditional contracting, which is invariably price-driven. ESCOs search for efficiencies and 




EPCs have a lower life-cycle cost than the directly funded projects which take more than two 
years longer to complete and survey with a 6% greater project costs. But, EPCs are also 
perceived as more risky because they are often non-asset-based investments, especially for small 
or start-up ESCOs (Vine, 2005).  
 
The ESCOs’ competitive advantage hinges on the ability to develop complex projects and offer 
performance contracts, primarily “guaranteed savings” agreements, but they also engage in non-
performance-based work, typically “design/build” contracts that cover the design and installation 
of equipment but not ongoing servicing or performance monitoring (Hopper et al., 2005). Figure 
6 shows the general matrix for common types of ESCO contracts as follows.  
 
“Shared savings” and “guaranteed savings” distinguish themselves based on the allocation of 
financing risks (Hopper et al., 2005). According to LBNL’s study, the U.S. ESCO market has 
shifted away from “shared savings” to “guaranteed savings” over the last decade and 86% of the 
performance-based projects have specified guarantees in their contracts (Goldman et al., 2005). 
EPC projects are classified as ESCO-financed guaranteed savings contracts, of which 66% were 
classified as guaranteed savings, and 7% as shared savings or other types of performance 
agreement. The remaining 27% are non-performance-based, design/build contracts (Hopper et al. 
2005), which decreases to 22% of reported 2008 industry revenues and 3% to ESCO consulting 
services (Satchwell et al., 2010).  
 
  Financing Risk 
  ESCOs Clients 
Performance 
Risk 
ESCOs (savings shared by 
ESCOs and clients) 
shared savings  
ESCOs (minimum savings 






Clients  design/build 
 




(Source: Public and Institutional Markets for ESCO Services: Comparing Programs, Practices 
and Performanceby by Hopper et al., 2005) 
 
A typical guaranteed savings project would normally be structured as in Figure 8 below. There 
are separate agreements required between the client and the ESCO, and the client and the bank or 
financier. The relationship between the bank and the ESCO is usually indirect, and primarily for 
the benefit of the bank to assess the stream of the guaranteed savings. The term “bank” here is 
































Figure 8. Relations between the Client, the ESCO and the Bank 
 
(Source: A Best Practice Guide to Energy Performance Contracts by AEPCA, 2000) 
 
Guaranteed savings contracts are preferred because of the greater certainty of savings, lower 
financing costs (most MUSH clients can obtain tax-exempt financing, whereas ESCOs cannot), 
and lower transaction costs (ESCOs can focus on project performance and need not assume 
financing risk) (Hopper et al. 2005). The risk of project under-performance is in the form of 
guarantee offered by the ESCO to the owner regarding the savings in energy cost for meeting or 
exceeding annual payment in order to cover all project costs (Vine et al. 1999). The value to 
clients of savings guarantees combined with long-term, reliable M&V lies in minimizing this risk 
by allocating responsibility for project performance to the ESCO and by identifying when 





Predicted energy savings are the ESCO’s predicted estimate of annual savings prior to 
installation of the project, and guaranteed energy savings are the annual energy savings 
guaranteed by the ESCO as part of a performance contract. The verified energy savings mean 
actual energy savings from the project that are verified by the ESCO after installation and that 
are reported either on a yearly basis or as a calculated annual average of actual energy savings 
achieved (Goldman, 2002). Shonder and Hughes (2007) analyzed the most current M&V reports 
from all ongoing projects of ORNL database and concluded that aggregate verified savings is 
about 108% of aggregate guaranteed cost savings. Aggregate verified savings is about 99% of 
the predicted savings, and ESCOs are guaranteeing about 91% of the cost savings they predicted 
for a given period.  
 
Hopper et al. (2005) had examined the difference between the predicted and verified energy 
savings. About 54% of projects had actual energy savings that exceeded predictions. Thirty-four 
percent experienced shortfalls relative to predicted savings (57% of these were shortfalls greater 
than 10%), and 12% of projects were 100% stipulated. Goldman (2002) had also conducted 
similar research and found in 63% of the cases that actual savings exceeded predicted savings. 
Thirteen percent of these projects stipulated savings for all installed measures (100% stipulated 
savings) and 59% of projects realized savings within 15% of ESCO predictions. 
 
The ratio of guaranteed to predicted savings provides an indicator of how much performance risk 
the ESCO is willing to assume. Goldman (2002) found that the relationship between guaranteed 
and predicted savings is driven mainly by individual ESCO business practices rather than by 
retrofit strategy. Segmented by company, 7 of the 15 different ESCOs consistently guaranteed 
100% of predicted savings. Six companies guaranteed between 50-100% of predicted savings 
and two companies actually guaranteed less than 50% of predicted savings. Among the eight 
ESCOs where guaranteed savings were less than predicted savings, no discernible pattern or 
formula (e.g., guaranteed savings are set at 80% of predicted savings) had been found, but rather 
the ratio of guaranteed to predicted savings tended to be project-specific.  
 
Shonder and Hughes (2007) found the total reported cost savings was 110% of the total 




of the 88 non-stipulated projects, which ranged from 0.7% to 22% of the annual guaranteed 
savings, with the average amount being 6% of the annual guaranteed cost savings. The average 
amount of the additional cost saving was 12% of the guaranteed cost savings. Another research 
study was based on the projects in the NAESCO/LBNL database, 72% experienced greater 
savings than were guaranteed by the ESCO. Nineteen percent encountered savings shortfalls, of 
which 63% reported shortfalls greater than 10%. (Hopper et al. 2005) 
 
2.3 Real Options Theory 
 
Real options theory is a modern approach for economic valuation of projects under uncertainty.  
It focuses on the managerial flexibility value to optimally respond of a changing scenario 
characterized by uncertainty.  
 
The long history of the theory of option pricing began in 1900 when the French mathematician 
Louis Bachelier deduced an option pricing formula based on the assumption that stock prices 
follow a Brownian motion with zero drift. Since that time, numerous researchers have 
contributed to the theory. Black and Scholes (1973) viewed most corporate liabilities such as 
common stock, corporate bonds and warrants as combinations of options and derived a 
theoretical valuation formula for them. In particular, the formula can be used to derive the 
discount that should be applied to a corporate bond because of the possibility of default. Merton 
(1973) examined and extended the seminal Black-Scholes theory of option pricing when 
dividends are paid on the underlying common stock and when the terms of the option contract 
can be changed explicitly by a change in exercise price or implicitly by a shift in the investment 
or capital structure policy of the firm. The effects of dividends and call provisions on the warrant 
price were also examined.  
 
Option theory embraces two principal research fields: financial option theory and real options 
theory. The former refers to option theory applied to assets traded in a financial market, while the 
latter concerns option theory applied to non-financial assets or real assets. The similarity between 




researchers such as Tourinho (1979) who pioneered to apply real options theory in studies on 
natural reserves, Brennan and Schwartz (1985) who discussed the option to stop operations and 
abandon a mine by considering commodity spot and future prices, McDonald and Siegel (1986) 
who motivated the use of the firm's opportunity cost of capital as the discount rate by assuming 
that projects are held by publicly owned corporations and Paddock et al. (1988) who used 
options theory to value the timing of an offshore leasing and development investment, extended 
the financial-option theories of Black and Scholes and Merton to encompass irreversible real 
investment such as investment in mining.  
 
In finance, the option is a derivative financial instrument that establishes a contract between two 
parties concerning the buying or selling of an asset at a reference price. The buyer of the option 
gains the right without the obligation to engage in some specific transaction on the asset, while 
the seller incurs the obligation to fulfill the transaction if so requested by the buyer. The price of 
an option derives from the difference between the reference price and the value of the underlying 
asset, commonly a stock, a bond, a currency or a futures contract, plus a premium based on the 
time remaining until the expiration of the option. 
 
As a discipline, real options extend from its application in corporate finance, to decision-making 
under uncertainty in general, adapting the techniques developed for financial options to real-life 
decisions. For example, R&D managers can use the real options method to help them determine 
where to best invest their money in research.  
 
Table 2. Comparison between Real Options “on” and “in” Projects 
 
Real options "on" projects Real options "in" projects 
Value opportunities Design flexibility 
Valuation important Decision important (go or no go) 
Relatively easy to define Difficult to define 
Interdependency/Path-dependency less an 
issue 
Interdependency/Path-dependency an important 
issue 
 





It thus forces decision-makers to be explicit about the assumptions underlying their projections, 
and for this reason, the real options method is increasingly employed as a tool in business 
strategy formulation. Real options can be categorized as those that are either “on” or “in” 
projects (de Neufville, 2002). Wang and de Neufville (2005) clarified the different nature of real 
options as Table 2 showing above. Real options “on” projects refer to the valuation of investment 
opportunities, while real options “in” projects are mostly concerned with design of flexibility.  
 
2.3.1 Real Options for Valuation 
 
Real options for valuation refer to the valuation of investment opportunities that are mostly 
concerned with an accurate value to assist sound investment decisions. For real options “on” 
projects, analysts need to get the value of options, which could be deemed as financial options 
taken on technical things, treating technology itself as a “black box” (Wang and de Neufville, 
2005). Myers (1977) first proposed the "real options" concept and compared the similarities 
between the financial options and real options. It referred to the application of option pricing 
theory to the valuation of non-financial or real investments with learning and flexibility, such as 
multi-stage R&D, modular manufacturing plant expansion and the like. Ross (1978) considered 
the inherent potential investment opportunity of risky projects as real options, and then discussed 
the theory of real option valuation. In an asset market where there are no unexploited arbitrage 
opportunities, there will exist a linear valuation operator that can unambiguously price return 
streams with perfect market substitutes or bound values for streams bounded by market 
combinations. 
 
Over the years, the real options theory has been significantly expanded. Borison (2003) 
recognized five major analytical approaches for applying real options to help corporate 
investment decisions as the classic approach, the subjective approach, the Market Asset 
Disclaimer (MAD) approach, the revised classic approach and the integrated approach. It 
concludes with observations about the relative strengths and weaknesses of the proposed 
approaches and specific recommendations on which ones to use in certain circumstances. Jaillet 




framework for swing options based on a one-factor mean-reverting stochastic process for energy 
prices that explicitly incorporates seasonal effects. A numerical scheme for the valuation of 
swing options calibrated for the case of natural gas has also been presented. 
 
Since the construction cost is not fixed and the cost uncertainty may affect the investment value, 
Yiu and Tam (2006) proposed a real options model using the binomial lattice method and 
analyzed a real-life construction project tender to examine how management flexibility and 
uncertainty provide real options value. The under-priced portion is the options value that the 
bidder is willing to pay for the flexibility and the uncertainty that enables contractors to be more 
competitive and in construction costs estimation. de Moraes Marreco and Carpio (2006) 
presented a valuation study of operational flexibility in the complex Brazilian Power System. 
They adopted a real options approach to calculate the fair value of a financial subsidy to be paid 
to the thermal generators for their availability to the system. Cui et al., (2008) presented an 
analysis of the effectiveness of the warranty clauses in the New Mexico State Highway and 
Transportation Department Route 44 project, which is the first long-term highway warranty 
project in the United States. Using the real options approach, it finds that the warranty ceiling 
clause can be evaluated and the ceiling on expenditure can be valuable.  
 
2.3.2 Real Options for Designing 
 
Real options for designing are options created by changing the actual design of the technical 
system, which are mostly concerned with the design of flexibility. It is mostly concerned with 
“go” or “no go” decisions and an accurate value is less important. For real options “in” projects, 
analysts do not have to provide the exact value of the options but simply provide what real 
flexibility to design into the physical systems (Wang and de Neufville, 2005). Ford et al., (2002) 
presented a real options approach for proactively using strategic flexibility to recognize and 
capture project values hidden in dynamic uncertainties. They applied the proposed method of 
valuing managerial flexibility as well as to evaluate and select strategic planning for a toll road 
project proposal. Potential impacts of the use of real options are discussed and challenges in 





Several authors have investigated the use of real options analysis in infrastructure problems, 
which helped to promote the feasibility estimation efficiency at the first beginning. Ho and Liu 
(2002) presented an option pricing based model, the BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) option 
valuation model, for evaluating the financial viability of a privatized infrastructure project. The 
quantitative model not only considers the project characteristics explicitly and evaluates the 
project from the perspectives of the project promoter and of the government when the project is 
under bankruptcy risk, but also evaluates the impact of the government guarantee and the 
developer negotiation option on the project financial viability. Zhao and Tseng (2003) presented 
the use of an option pricing model for assessing design flexibility in infrastructure projects. The 
foundation of a parking garage can be enhanced to take into account a future expansion due to an 
increased service demand. Enhancing the foundation and columns represents an up-front cost, 
but it has a return in flexibility for future expansion. The proposed real options model is used to 
assess the expansion option relative to the construction of a public parking garage with the 
optimal foundation size determined. Valuation modeling such as discounted cash flow analysis 
with uncertainty modeling is important to capitalize on the worth of flexibility. Zhao et al., (2004) 
presented a multi-stage stochastic model for decision-making in highway development, operation, 
expansion, and rehabilitation. The proposed real options model accounts for the evolution of 
three uncertainties such as traffic demand, land price, and highway deterioration, as well as their 
interdependency, which achieves decision-making optimality that is generally not well defined in 
traditional policy-based approaches for highway planning.  
 
Considering those flexibilities at the very start of the financing estimation shall help the 
implementation of a satisfactory infrastructure project. Garvin and Cheah (2004) applied real 
options valuation on a model of the Dulles Greenway, a BOT toll road in Virginia, U.S., to 
incorporate the option of waiting to build the highway limited to five years. The presentation 
illustrates that the selection of a valuation model depends critically upon the characteristics of a 
project’s variables and that informed judgment remains an integral part of the decision-making 
process. Bowe and Lee (2004) analyzed the Taiwan High-Speed Rail project, the construction 
and operation of the rail system embodying multiple interacting flexibilities, involving the option 




options to expand or to contract and the option to abandon or switch use at any time. The value 
of these options is shown, which greatly reduces the risk of the project. Based on data available 
in practice, de Neufville et al., (2006) presented a spreadsheet approach for valuing flexibility in 
engineering systems, which uses standard procedures and provides graphics that explain the 
results intuitively. The expansion option for a multistory parking garage is also employed as the 
practical application of the proposed approach. 
 
2.3.3 Practice in Guarantee Valuation  
 
Guarantees and subsidies have been valued by many authors and non-standard real options have 
also been considered as popular tools to measure the uncertainty behind. The topic attracted 
moderate interest and a number of articles were published on theory and applications. Pollio 
(1998) explored the preference for and the features unique to project finance, one of the favored 
vehicles for funding energy development. According to Pollio, an additional benefit of the 
proposed guarantee is to minimize an implicit abandonment option. In high leveraged projects 
involving project finance structures, the concessionaire could decide to pay the debt service or to 
abandon the project in each period.  Huang & Chou (2006) valued a minimum revenue guarantee, 
an option to abandon during the construction phase and the interaction among them in BOT 
infrastructure projects using an analytical method. The Taiwan High-Speed Rail Project is 
chosen as a numerical case to apply the formulas and the results show both the minimum revenue 
guarantee and the option to abandon can create values. Cheah & Liu (2006) analyzed the 
minimum revenue guarantee in the case of the Malaysia-Singapore Second Crossing, which 
shows the value of a guarantee can indeed be significant relative to the basic net present value. 
Relevant elements of a contractual package are treated as a form of real options and a proposition 
is put forward to incorporate the value of such options into the negotiation framework.  
 
In privately financed infrastructure projects host governments usually provide financial support 
by means of guarantees. Irwin (2003) mentioned that when the guarantees have been specified in 
the contract, though the governments indeed do not incur immediate cash cost, they must assume 




good  decisions  about the  provision  of fiscal  support  for  private  infrastructure  services  and 
provides  some tools  to  facilitate  the analysis. Irwin (2007) explained a World Bank study on 
how governments value the guarantees they are thinking of granting and how they can modify 
aspects of public sector management to improve the likely quality of their decisions about 
guarantees. Making better decisions about guarantees and subsidies helps governments respond 
to such requests and make precise the invoked principle that risks should be allocated to those 
best placed to manage them.  
 
Some empirical studies about revenue guarantee in infrastructure projects have also adopted real 
options analysis techniques for their valuation. Chiara et al. (2007) proposed a new approach for 
revenue guarantees improving risk mitigation and facilitating contractual and financial 
negotiations in BOT projects, considering that the exercise dates are determined during the 
operational phase. The multi-least-squares Monte Carlo technique is presented to determine the 
fair value of this variety of real options. Alonso-Conde et al., (2007) analyzed the Melbourne 
CityLink Project, a toll road in Australia and consider option to abandon the operation when the 
revenue shortfall is below a specified maximum loss threshold or when the investor’s DCF rate 
of return becomes smaller than a certain agreed value. Two agreements can be identified as 
interacting options embedded in the project. One is that the government has the right to terminate 
the project before the end of the concession term if investor’s IRR is greater than a certain agreed 
value. The other is the option that the investors have to defer the payment of the concession fee 
to the government under certain conditions. Doan & Patel (2010) modeled the BOT toll road 
investment with cost and revenue uncertainties in the presence of government guarantees as a 
portfolio of real options with cost contingency and government subsidy at the operation stage. 
They demonstrated that the investment value is highly sensitive to cost and revenue uncertainties 
and a numerical example suggested that the investment value of risky project is higher when net 
income guarantee is used instead of minimum revenue guarantee.  
 





This section covers the past and current literature, which follows two research threads of EPC 
statement in practice and the development of option theory. Based on the literature review, we 
learned the critical role that the EPC has played in the energy efficiency progress acceleration, 
also their current market segments and the industry structure information. Not only improving 
facilities to be more comfortable and reliable, EPC is a kind of win-win service for both the 
clients and ESCOs to achieve the energy reduction and environmental goals. There are several 
critical parameters associated with EPC such as the utility price rate, the installed facility 
performance, the operation and maintenance cost savings, etc., as a result of the lengthy life 
cycle of the project, complex contracting mechanisms and a complex pool of finances. Also, we 
know the development of real options theory from the financial options and its current 
application. In finance, the option is a derivative financial instrument that establishes a contract 
between two parties concerning the buying or selling of an asset at a reference price. As a 
discipline, real options extend from its application in corporate finance, to decision-making 
under uncertainty in general, adapting the techniques developed for financial options to real-life 
decisions. Real options for valuation refer to the valuation of investment opportunities, while real 
options for designing are mostly concerned with the design of flexibility. In this study, most 
articles in the option theory review part are selected from the infrastructure area. The guarantee 
clauses and subsidies specified in the project contract are valuable and can be evaluated, which 
helps to decide the amount of risk contingency for reserving.  
 
After reviewing all the market and industry information on the EPC model, we can conclude that 
there is enough necessity and significance to develop such a stochastic model and conduct 
sensitivity analysis on the specified energy savings guarantee. Since it could not only give the 
clients a great reference on the optimal EPC bidder selection and future budget arrangements, but 
also helps ESCOs reasonably allocate the estimated financial risks with successful contract 
negotiation. Reviewing the literature of the real options theory helps us make sure the feasibility 
of identifying the uncertainties of the framework and stochastic processes for the energy savings 
guarantee setting. Explaining the causations for general energy consumption volatility and giving 
corresponding estimation is another goal in this study, which explores the inner relations 




Chapter 3: Valuation of the Energy Savings Guarantee  
3.1 Introduction 
 
The scheme where an ESCO promises a certain level of annual energy savings that shields the 
client from the performance risks is known as guaranteed energy savings. Most ESCOs 
guarantee the certain amount of energy savings that the project will deliver based on their 
historical experience. When requesting proposals the client also request information that 
demonstrates the financial condition of the ESCO and its ability to support the performance 
guarantees. 
 
Due to the potential low-performance and loss risks, ESCOs virtually never guarantee a hundred 
percent of predicted savings and there is always a difference between the predicted and 
guaranteed savings amounts. Based on the ORNL research of 2007, there are only 12% of the 
projects where the reported annual cost savings were equal to the guaranteed cost savings, 
suggesting that all of the savings in these projects were stipulated. On average, ESCOs guarantee 
about 91% of the estimated cost savings and projects report they achieve about 99% of the 
predicted cost savings. In other words, the projects report 108% of their guaranteed cost savings 
in general and the average amount of the additional cost saving was 12% of the guaranteed cost 
savings (Shonder and Hughes, 2007). 
 
The measurement and verification process that compares the verified energy savings with the 
guarantee has been conducted year by year. However, the certain amount of guarantee had 
already been specified in the contract at the very beginning of the project and would not be 
changed barring any unforeseen circumstance. Thus, both ESCOs and clients consider the 
savings revenue risk an important factor when they assess an energy performance project’s 
feasibility due to the volatile energy prices and high technical instability. Inner relations among 
the predicted energy savings, guaranteed energy savings and the verified energy savings have 






Figure 9. Relations among the Predicted, Guaranteed and Verified Energy Savings 
 
Predicted annual energy savings could be varied for different years and multiple stochastic 
processes could be considered for the whole operation and maintenance period, one for each year. 
The valuation of the annual guarantees can be modeled as a series of independent European 
options with maturities between the first and the delivery years. For each year, the value to 
clients of ongoing M&V in a guaranteed savings contract lies in identifying when savings 
shortfalls occur and savings guarantees should be exercised. To design an energy cost savings 
guarantee, two pieces of specific information need to be delivered in the contract: the guaranteed 
energy savings amount and the split proportions if savings are over-achieved. Since the form of 
the guarantees varies between projects that are designed to fit the requirements of particular 
clients, as well as federal and state regulations, typically, if there is a shortfall in savings, the 
ESCO reimburses the client, and if savings exceed the ESCO’s guarantee, the client keeps the 
excess or splits the over-performance part at a certain proportion with ESCOs. For instance, on 
Honeywell’s website, savings guarantee has been explained as “if the new energy systems fail to 
reduce costs as required, Honeywell makes up the difference. Any savings above the guarantee 
are the client’s to keep.” Danfoss has also said “if we promise to save you 1 million EUR in an 
energy performance project and only manage to save you 800,000 EUR, we pay you the 200,000 
EUR difference. If we find more, we split the over-performance, usually 50-50.” 
 
Clients award these energy performance contracts to ESCOs based on their ability to meet the 
terms and conditions. From the clients’ perspectives, an energy savings guarantee should be 




surely decreases the potential loss risks but at the same time reduces the chances for ESCOs to 
win the competitive bid. The trade-off point for ESCOs is critical and the contract specifying 
how to share the exceeding verified profit between ESCOs and clients above the fixed-price 
guarantee are of great importance for paying further attention. Having a better understanding on 
the potential benefit sharing could not only give the clients a great reference on the optimal EPC 
bidder selection, future schedule and budget arrangements, but also helps ESCOs reasonably 
allocate the estimated financial risks with successful contract negotiation. 
 
3.2 Energy Savings Guarantee  
 
In financial options, the volatility of stock price is a function of the uncertainty for the stock 
price movements, because the flexibility is built into the financial instrument. When applying the 
financial options theory for the purposes of project valuation, an estimation of volatility is 
required. In the EPC case, the volatility of expected energy savings revenue is a combination 
function of the energy price fluctuation and the facility performance instability. Year is a good 
unit for volatility analysis since it minimizes the shifting seasonal inference. It is also more 
convenient to get the estimated and verified performance records. In the EPC model, multiple 
stochastic processes need to be considered because the whole O&M period usually lasts more 
than ten years. There is a time series of annual predicted energy savings from the project 
financial estimation that needs to be compared with the verified energy savings each year 
through M&V process. Upon the analogic features between the levers of real option and the 
financial option value, we build the energy savings guarantee option model for a specific year as 
the mapping between the project characteristics and financial option value drivers depicted in the 
following Table 3.  
 
For a specific year, the energy savings guarantee could be deemed as the exercise price (X), since 
it has been fixed at the beginning of the project lifecycle, which gives a cut-off point whether the 
energy savings guarantee need to be executed. Similarly, the actual energy cost savings is 
analogous to the stock price (S), which is affected by many potential risk factors and has both the 




savings at the first beginning. The time to measurement and verification could be compared with 
the time of maturity in a financial option (t). It is the period of time, expressed in years, from the 
beginning of the project to the specific year when measurement and verification has been 
conducted and the verified energy savings have been recorded. The risk-free rate (rf ) and the 
volatility of expected cost savings (σ) also have the similar features as in the financial market 
when applied to a real options situation.  
 
Table 3  Mapping between the Financial Option Drivers and Savings Guarantee 
 
Financial option value levers Variable Real option value levers 
Exercise price X Energy savings guarantee 
Stock price S Verified energy cost savings 
Time to expiry t Time to M&V 
Risk-free interest rate rf Risk-free interest rate 
Uncertainty of stock price movements σ Volatility of expected cost savings 
 
In most EPC cases, ESCOs secure a minimum amount of energy-saving revenue and the 
guarantee for the savings that is produced by the project will be sufficient to cover the cost of 
financing for the whole lifecycle of the project. Figure 10 below illustrates the estimated cost 
composition of the energy savings guarantee during the whole project life cycle. The verified 
annual cost savings have not been reached yet in the graph, and the guaranteed energy savings 
part have not taken the potential volatile energy price rates or the ECMs’ technical performance 





Figure 10. Composition of the Energy Savings Guarantee 
 
 
Typically, there are two common kinds of guarantees in EPC according to the different situations: 
one is to guarantee the yearly energy savings quantity ( QtG ) that has been broken down by the 
categorized ECMs ( QtjG ) where the footnote t stands for a specific year and j represents a utility 
category; the other is to guarantee a monetary based amount of annual energy savings (Gt) for 
the entire project. Associated with the destination that the energy savings guarantee goes to each 
year, the following formula could be reached as Equation (1) and Equation (2) showing below. 
Here, all the savings and costs are financial-based in order to illustrate the inner relations with a 
consistent unit and make comparison. For the tth year, the categorized energy unit price rate (PEtj) 









+∑ ) or the guaranteed energy savings (Gt) could be 
decomposed by the client savings profit within the guarantee (ProfitCt), the bank loan payment 
(CFt), the operation & maintenance cost for the new facility installed (C’Mt), the measurement & 
verification cost (CVt), and the ESCOs’ profit within guarantee (ProfitEt). Within our EPC context, 




takes very similar charges each year for the M&V procedure without huge uncertainties existed 










+∑  = ProfitCt + CFt + C’Mt + CVt + ProfitEt (1)  
 Gt = ProfitCt + CFt + C’Mt + CVt + ProfitEt (2)  
 
Here we sum the bank loan payment (CFt), the operation & maintenance cost for the new facility 
installed (C’Mt) and the measurement & verification cost (CVt) as a constant cost (Ct) for the 
following discussion. 
 









+∑  = ProfitCt + Ct + ProfitEt 
(4)  
 Gt = ProfitCt + Ct + ProfitEt (5)  
 
3.2.1 Energy Quantity Savings Guarantee  
 
One of the EPC guarantees that have been widely adopted on a yearly basis is the annual energy 
quantity savings guarantee, which is usually broken down by ECMs categories. This contract 
option model has just taken the facility technical instability risk factor into consideration and 
paid more attention to the verified energy savings quantity than the measurement and verification 
cost mentioned before. This tool is useful for the ESCOs to focus more on the reliable quality 
work they are going to deliver, and at the same time, eliminate the potential energy price 
volatility risks that they have no power to control. For the operation and maintenance cost 
savings, usually they are also deemed as one kind of ECM savings quantity into the contract and 
therefore could be valued appropriately. Taking the risk factors of the energy savings guarantee 




guaranteed energy quantity savings (GQt) in order to calculate the clients total savings profit 
(Profit’Ct) and the ESCOs total profit (Profit’Et) under uncertainty. PEt represents the portfolio 
energy unit price at the tth year. 
 
From the Clients’ perspective, in the simplified yearly energy quantity savings guarantee, the 
payoff of the energy savings guarantee on a specific year will be represented as follows: the 
guaranteed energy savings quantity (GQt) is non-monetary based and different from the 
guaranteed energy savings (Gt) mentioned before. The portfolio energy unit price at the t
th year 
(PEt) is the spot price of time t. 
 
If Qt < GQt, Extra ProfitCt = 0 (6)  
If Qt  ≥ GQt, Extra ProfitCt = (Qt- GQt) * PEt *α1  (7)  
 
Combining them together, formula for the client’s extra profit (Extra ProfitCt) with guaranteed 
quantity savings could be presented as Equation (8) showing below. 
Extra ProfitCt =max[0, (Qt- GQt) * PEt *α1] (8)  
 
Considering the percentage of clients’ savings revenue sharing within the guaranteed energy 
savings (α0), the client savings profit within the guarantee (ProfitCt) could be reached as Equation 
(9) showing below.  
 ProfitCt = PEt*GQt*α0 (9)  
 
There are both possibilities that the guarantee may or may not be executed. If the verified energy 
savings (Qt) do not reach the guaranteed amount (GQt), clients could get the specified proportion 
of benefit from the guarantee. Even so, if the verified energy savings (Qt) exceed the guarantee 
(GQt), clients could get the profit from both the proportion of guarantee and the exceeding 




(11). Another important parameter, the percentage of clients’ extra profit sharing beyond the 
guarantee (α1), has also been considered. 
If Qt < GQt, Profit’Ct = ProfitCt = PEt*GQt *α0 (10)  
If Qt  ≥ GQt, Profit’Ct = ProfitCt + (Qt- GQt) * PEt *α1  
                     = PEt *GQt *α0 + (Qt- GQt) * PEt *α1 
(11)  
 
Combining them together, formula for the client’s extra profit (Extra ProfitCt) with guaranteed 
quantity savings could be presented as Equation (12) showing below. 
Profit’Ct  = max[PEt*GQt *α0, PEt *GQt *α0 +(Qt- GQt)* PEt*α1] (12)  
 
Based on Equations (10) and (11), the client’s extra profit (Profit’Ct) graph could be drawn as 
follows, which looks like a European call option with the underlying assets of the verified energy 
savings on the tth year (Qt).  
   
Figure 11. The Clients’ Profit on the Energy Quantity Savings Guarantee 
 
 
Similarly, the extra profit of the guarantee from the ESCO’s perspective for the tth year should be 




If Qt < GQt, Extra ProfitEt = (Qt - GQt)* PEt (13)  
If Qt ≥ GQt, Extra ProfitEt = (Qt - GQt) * PEt * (1-α1) (14)  
 
Combining them together, formula for the client’s extra profit (Extra ProfitCt) with guaranteed 
quantity savings could be presented as Equation (15) showing below. 
Extra ProfitEt  = min[(Qt - GQt)* PEt, (Qt - GQt) * PEt * (1-α1)] (15)  
 
If the verified energy savings (Qt) do not reach the guaranteed amount (GQt), ESCOs need to 
make up the deficiency. Meanwhile, if the verified energy savings amount (Qt) exceeds the 
guarantee (GQt), ESCOs could not only get the specified profit from the guarantee, but also the 
proportion of the exceeding sharing. 
If Qt < GQt, Profit’Et = ProfitEt + (Qt - GQt) * PEt (16)  
If Qt ≥ GQt, Profit’Et = ProfitEt + (Qt - GQt) * PEt * (1-α1) (17)  
 
Combining Equations (16) and (17) together, formula for the client’s extra profit (Extra ProfitCt) 
with guaranteed quantity savings could be presented as Equation (18) showing below. 
Profit’Et = min[ProfitEt + (Qt - GQt)* PEt, ProfitEt + (Qt - GQt) * PEt * (1-α1)] (18)  
 
According to Equation (16) and Equation (17), the option graph could be described as the 






Figure 12. The ESCOs’ Profit on the Energy Quantity Savings Guarantee 
 
No matter what final verified energy quantity savings (Qt) has been reached, the sum of the total 
profit for both the clients and the ESCOs stays the same, which equals to (PEt*GQt*(α0-1) + 
ProfitEt + PEt*Qt ). It means that this kind of guarantee in the contract has changed the future 
savings profit risk allocation according to the actual energy quantity savings performance. 
 
3.2.2 Energy Cost Savings Guarantee  
 
The other contract model that has also been popularly adopted in EPC is to guarantee fixed 
monetary amount of annual energy savings in the entire EPC operation period. This is much 
easier for the clients to understand and control what further energy savings revenue could be 
reached, and at the same time, be more convenient for the ESCO’s financing and ECMs 
conducted flexibility adjustment. This contract model has taken both the energy prices volatility 
and facility technical instability risk factors into consideration. The risk analysis model goes a 
little bit more complex comparing with the energy quantity savings guarantee contract mode 
discussed before. 
 
For the energy cost savings guarantee, the option value of the guarantee in a specific year could 
be represented as following Equation (19) and (20) from the options perspective, which is 




If I’t < Gt, Extra ProfitCt  = 0 (19)  
If I’t ≥ Gt, Extra ProfitCt = ( I
’
t- Gt ) * α1  (20)  
 
Combining them together, formula for the client’s extra profit (Extra ProfitCt) with guaranteed 
quantity savings could be presented as Equation (21) showing below. 
Extra ProfitCt  = max[0, ( I
’
t- Gt ) * α1] (21)  
 
Taken the risk factors of the energy savings guarantee back into consideration, predicted energy 
cost savings (It) and verified energy cost savings (I
’
t) are used to compare with the guaranteed 
energy savings (Gt) in order to calculate the ESCOs total profit (Profit’Et) and the clients total 
savings profit (Profit’Ct) under uncertainty. Two important parameters, the percentage of clients 
sharing within the guaranteed energy savings (α0) and the clients’ percentage in the exceeding 
profit sharing (α1), are also paid attention to. We could reach Equation (22) as follows. 
 ProfitCt = Gt*α0 (22)  
 
From the Clients’ perspective, there are both the possibilities that the guarantee may or may not 
be executed. If the verified energy savings do not reach the guaranteed amount, then clients 
could get the specified proportion of benefit from the guarantee. If the verified energy cost 
savings (I’t) exceed the guarantee (Gt), clients could get the profit from both the proportion of 
guarantee and the exceeding sharing. Concretely, the profit for the tth year should be presented as 
Equation (23) and (24). 
If I’t < Gt, Profit’Ct= ProfitCt = Gt*α0 (23)  
If I’t ≥ Gt, Profit’Ct= ProfitCt + ( I
’
t - Gt) *α1 = Gt*α0 + ( I
’





Combining them together, formula for the client’s extra profit (Extra ProfitCt) with guaranteed 
quantity savings could be presented as Equation (25) showing below. 
Profit’Ct = max[Gt*α0, Gt*α0 + ( I
’
t - Gt) *α1] (25)  
 
Based on Equations (23) and (24), the Profit’Ct graph could be drawn as follows with the 
underlying assets of the verified energy savings on the tth year. 
 
   
Figure 13. The Clients’ Profit on the Energy Cost Savings Guarantee 
 
 
From the ESCO’s perspective, the profit for the tth year should be presented as Equations (26) 
and (27) showing below.  
If I’t < Gt, Extra ProfitEt = (I
’
t- Gt) (26)  
If I’t ≥ Gt, Extra ProfitEt = (I
’
t- Gt) *(1-α1) (27)  
 
Combining them together, formula for the client’s extra profit (Extra ProfitCt) with guaranteed 
quantity savings could be presented as Equation (28) showing below. 
Extra ProfitEt = min[(I
’
t- Gt), ( I
’




If the verified energy savings do not reach the guaranteed amount, ESCOs need to make up the 
deficiency. Further, if the verified energy savings exceed the guarantee, ESCOs could not only 
get the specified profit from the guarantee, but also the proportion of the exceeding sharing. 
If I’t < Gt, Profit’Et= ProfitEt + (I
’
t- Gt) (29)  
If I’t ≥ Gt, Profit’Et= ProfitEt + (I
’
t- Gt) *(1-α1) (30)  
 
Combining them together, formula for the client’s extra profit (Extra ProfitCt) with guaranteed 
quantity savings could be presented as Equation (31) showing below. 
Profit’Et = min[ProfitEt + (I
’
t- Gt), ProfitEt + ( I
’
t- Gt )*(1-α1)] 






t- Gt )*(1-α1)] 
(31)  
 
Then, the ESCO’s profit graph on the energy cost savings guarantee could be described as the 
following Figure 14, which has a different graph shape from Figure 13 above. 
 
 
Figure 14. The ESCO’s Profit on the Energy Cost Savings Guarantee 
 
 
Regardless of what final verified energy cost savings (I’t) has been achieved, the sum of the total 






Gt). It means that this kind of guarantee in the contract has convert the future savings profit risk 
allocation to another standard according to the actual energy cost savings performance. 
 
3.4 Verified Energy Savings Pricing Model  
 
Based on the energy savings guarantee analysis above, the clients’ extra savings profit (Extra 
ProfitCt) stays either zero or above regardless of the energy savings guarantee type which would 
never fall to be negative. It means that even if the clients did not earn money from the guarantee, 
they would not have any potential expenditure if certain guarantee clause has been specified in 
the contract. However, ESCOs need to carefully consider the guarantee design which may cause 
huge loss if the guarantee was set inappropriately. ESCOs shall afford the potential loss risk if 
the guarantee has been specified in the contract and the risk analysis is focused from the ESCO’s 
perspective. They also have more power on the EPC controlling. 
 
The clients’ total savings profit (Profit’Ct) could be discounted as Equation (32) displayed, which 
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∑ ∑  (32)  
 
The ESCOs’ total profit (Profit’Et) is different from Equation (32) showing above which also 
been expected the higher the better from the ESCOs’ perspective. 
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During the whole O&M period (T= n years), the predicted annual energy savings (It) could be 
varied from year to year, while the guaranteed savings stay constant. Therefore, the trade-off 




energy savings (I’t). Here the discount rate (r) has taken both the risk-free rate (rf ) and the risk 
premium into consideration.  
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Under this situation, the ESCOs’ expected total extra savings profit shall be equal to zero. 
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From the ESCOs’ view, making more conservative energy savings guarantees surely decreases 
the potential loss risks but at the same time reduces the chances for ESCOs to win the 
competitive bid. Because most clients are risk-avoided who prefer the more secured energy 
savings promise and in practice the higher the better. Therefore, the accurate total energy cost 
savings guarantee which converges towards the verified energy savings is the ESCOs’ 
expectation. 
 
3.3 Risk Analysis Model 
 
The actual energy savings are verified by the ESCOs after installation and are reported either on 
a yearly basis or as a calculated annual average of actual energy savings achieved (Goldman, 
2002). There are three main factors that may affect the potential deficient or exceeding 
performance of the verified annual energy savings at the tth year (I’t), as the different energy unit 
price rate (PEtj), the varied energy savings quantity (Qtj) and the operation & maintenance cost 
savings (CMt). Here, j implies the certain kind of utility savings. The verified energy cost savings 
(I’t) could be represented by the sum of savings that comes from both the utility consumption 
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Here, we use the portfolio energy unit price at the tth year (PEt) and the total verified energy 
quantity savings at the same year (Qt) to simplify the calculation process in Equation (36) above, 
which combines all different kinds of energy savings from varied ECMs, including the operation 
& maintenance cost savings (CMt), as Equation (37) shows below. 
 
 ' *t Et tI P Q=  
(37)  
 
Given those uncertainties about the future level of the energy price rate and utility consumption 
amount, we consider both the portfolio energy unit price at the tth year (PEt) and the total 
consumed energy quantity at the tth year (Qt) vary in time following the stochastic process of 
GBM in order to model this energy cost savings guarantee contract.  
Equation (38) below has been added in for the better risk issues explanation which illustrates the 
evolution process of the portfolio energy unit price at the tth year (PEt). 
 
1( )Et Et Et Et EtdP P dt P dz tα σ= +  (38)  
 
Where dPEt is the incremental change in the energy unit price rate during a short period of time dt, 
αEt is the energy unit price growth rate in a short period of time dt, 
σEt is the volatility of the energy unit price rate, 
dz1(t) = Ɛ1√, where Ɛ1 ~ N(0,1) is the standard Wiener process. 
Based on Equation (38) above, we can reach the following analogic results in Equations (39) and 
(40) as follows, which show the detailed information between each time period for the portfolio 
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(40)  
 
This process can be complete specifying only its initial value (PE0), an annual growth trend (αE) 
and the volatility of the process (σE), which we usually assume to be constant during the 
concession period. Simulations could be conducted through Equation (39) and (40). 
 
Given the uncertainty about the future level of the utility consumption amount in order to model 
this variable, we also consider the total energy savings quantity at the tth year (Qt) vary 
stochastically in time, following a GBM as is usually used in mathematical finance to model 
stock prices. Equation (41) has been reached as follows. 
 
2 ( )t Qt t Qt tdQ Q dt Q dz tα σ= +  (41)  
 
Where dQt is the incremental change in the total consumed energy quantity during a short period 
of time dt, 
αQt is the energy consumption savings quantity growth rate in a short period of time dt,  
σQt  is the volatility of the energy savings quantity,  
dz2(t) = Ɛ2 √, where Ɛ2 ~ N(0,1) is the standard Wiener process. 
Similar to Equations (39) and (40), we can also reach the following analogic results in Equations 
(42) and (43) as follows, which show the detailed information between each time period for the 
total energy savings quantity at the tth year (Qt). 
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This process can be completely specified considering only its initial value Q0, a yearly growth 
rate (αQ) and the volatility of the process (σQ), which we assume to be constant during the 




() where i represents any one or more years that the most accurate performance estimation has 
been conducted based on the known information. 
 
Combining both the stochastic processes of the portfolio energy unit price at the tth year (PEt) and 
the total energy savings quantity at the tth year (Qt) together, Equation (44) and Equation (45) 
could be reached below according to Ito’s Lemma.  
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Here, ρ is the correlation coefficient of dz1 and dz2. At the same time, ρ equals to the expectation 
of Ɛ1Ɛ2. The potential inner correlations between the portfolio energy unit price at the t
th year (PEt) 
and the total energy savings quantity at the tth year (Qt) should be considered if necessary. 
 
3.5 Model Discussion  
 
Either the energy quantity savings guarantee or the energy cost savings guarantee gives an option 
to the client that they have the authority to choose how to define the verified energy savings 
amount as the measurement result or the fixed amount specified in the contract. It is very similar 
to the options in financial markets with the underlying assets of the verified energy savings on 
the tth year. In financial options, the volatility of stock prices is a function of the uncertainty for 
the stock price movements, which could be analogic to the stochastic process of GBM. In the 
EPC case, the estimation of volatility is a little bit different between the energy quantity savings 
guarantee and the energy cost savings guarantee when applying financial options theory. The 
expected energy savings revenue is a combination function of the energy price rate and the 
facility savings performance volume. Here, we consider the energy cost savings guarantee of the 




expected in the energy quantity savings guarantee contract. For the energy cost savings guarantee 
contract, we also consider the potential the energy price rate volatility that never stays constant 
as another stochastic variable that combines with the facility instable performance together to 
affect the future EPC savings revenue during the O&M period of the project whole lifecycle. 
 
Both the ESCOs and the clients consider the annual energy savings revenue to be an important 
risk factor when they assess the feasibility of an energy performance project due to the volatile 
energy prices and high technical instability through the whole operation period. In real practice, 
the predicted annual energy savings should be varied at different years because of the nature of 
the facilities performance. For example, since all the ECMs have to be installed in some 
sequences that may delay the best performance for the renewed facilities at the very beginning of 
the project, the energy savings should demonstrate an increasing trend at the first few contract 
years. Then, as time goes by, some ECMs may suffer deterioration and might not perform as 
well as before, so the energy savings amount might also decrease. Those trends and specific 
energy savings amount could be foreseeable by the experienced implementation engineers before 
signing the contract, especially at the savings quantity level. Thus, here we could reasonably 
assume that the estimation for the predicting energy savings quantity () has stood for the best 
performance estimation that has already been conducted based on the existing information.  
 
Based on the most accurate estimation, for the total verified energy quantity savings (Qt), this 
process can be completely specified considering only its initial value Q0, a yearly growth rate 
and the volatility of the process that we assume to be constant during the O&M period before 
delivery, which represents the evolution process of the project revenue. Or, it could also be 
adjusted according to the recognized financial feasible information that any one or more years 
when best performance estimation has been conducted based on the existing information. 
Multiple stochastic processes should be considered for the whole O&M period, one for each year, 
and the valuation of the annual guarantees can be modeled as a series of independent European 




Chapter 4: Case Study of the University of Maryland College Park 
The University of Maryland main campus occupies 1,250 acres (5.1 km2) of land in Prince 
George’s County, Maryland, U.S.A, with 264 buildings that include classrooms and laboratories, 
as well as residence halls, dining facilities, libraries, offices buildings, athletic facilities, and 
performance centers. The inventory also includes the Maryland Fire and Rescue Institute (MFRI) 
and the Maryland Agricultural Experiment Station (MAES) managed by the College of 
Agriculture and Natural Resources, which occupies an additional 1,300 acres of land throughout 
the State. In 2009, the University’s building space, including its satellite programs, occupied 398 
buildings totaling 13.4 million square feet. Since 2005, square footage growth has been flat with 
an average annual growth rate of just 0.3%. In October 2009, the university was named 
America's Greenest Campus by Climate Culture for having the largest number of campus 
community members register to calculate their carbon footprint. 
 
 
Figure 15. University of Maryland College Park Campus 
 
Both the University and the State of Maryland are making great strides in green building 
construction and renovation. As a public research university founded in 1856, the University of 




our case, 75% of those 264 buildings are more than 25 years old and 32% of them have exceeded 
50 years. The average age for the campus buildings is 40 years and 55% of them require 
renovation. As a result, the operation and maintenance cost increases $18 million each year. 
Since the buildings operation conditions varied, each building receives a comprehensive energy 
audit to determine a customized list of conservation measures that would provide the best results. 
With an energy bill of over $50 million per year, climbing energy rates, and growing concerns 
about the effects of greenhouse gas emissions on the environment, it is necessary for the 
university to start implementing energy efficiency and conservation upgrades for facilities 





In April 2009, the University of Maryland, College Park (UMCP) and Johnson Controls, Inc. 
signed a 13-year Comprehensive Energy Efficiency and Guaranteed Savings Program contract, 
which adopted the Energy Performance Contracting service to improve facility infrastructure 
around campus while reducing energy expenditure costs. The performance contracts allow 
energy conservation measures and technologies to be installed without upfront capital cost to the 
university, and the ESCO is repaid through utility bill savings over the term of the contract. In 
this case, the University of Maryland is the client and Johnson Controls is the ESCO that 
provides energy conservation measures in nine important buildings around the campus, which 
help the campus community live, work, and learn in increasingly efficient buildings while 
enjoying a higher standard of indoor environmental quality.  
 
The common ECMs Johnson Controls plans to use for UMCP projects include lighting redesign, 
lighting occupancy controls, vending machine controls, domestic water upgrades, non-domestic 
water conservation, infiltration reduction, window replacement, steam trap replacement, 
insulation blankets, pipe insulation, energy awareness program, SEEC, etc, which could be 
categorized as Figure 16 shows below. The estimation of energy conservation and facility 





Figure 16. Energy Conservation and Facility Improvement Measures for UMCP 
From the EPC win-win project model, Johnson Controls will provide UMCP with maintenance 
and training support, as well as ongoing performance-monitoring services, and then be 
compensated from a 22% energy and operating cost avoidance each year compared to the 
baseline. Also, UMCP can get a 20% reduction of GHG in selected buildings that is the 
equivalent of planting 20,700 trees per year with a carbon footprint reduction of 4,100 tons of 
greenhouse gas emissions annually. This program not only improves the productivity while 
reducing maintenance costs, but also supports achievement of the Presidents Climate 
Commitment and the Governor’s Empower Maryland energy reduction goals. The ESCO 
guarantees projected savings and a measurement and verification program ensures that these 
savings are realized, which promised $1.7 million in energy costs avoided annually. 
 
Through this energy-efficiency program with a portfolio of EPC projects, Johnson Controls 
provides UMCP with a guaranteed fixed price of $1,904,343 to cover all of the costs savings 
associated with the selected ECMs and operational savings annually. This financial commitment, 
which represents as a typical energy cost savings guarantee contract model, means that Johnson 
Controls is responsible for delivering the guaranteed savings result for the clearly defined and 
agreed-upon price. If the verified energy savings amount is less than the specified guaranteed, 




actual energy savings amount will be measured monthly and reconciled annually with UMCP, 
which takes both the energy price volatility and the facility technical instability risk factors into 
consideration. Year is a good unit for volatility analysis, which eliminates the seasonal utility 
volatile factors.  
 
However, certain information has been blurred in the energy performance contract between 
Johnson Controls and UMCP; for instance, how to set the sharing proportion if the exceeding 
energy savings amount has been achieved beyond the guarantee to appropriately allocate the 
energy price and facility performance risks in order to maximally protect the benefits for both 
sides and lead to successful cooperation. In the current EPC market, the percentages of extra 
profit sharing for the exceeding part of energy cost savings beyond the given guarantees seem 
varied between the clients and ESCOs according to their historical experience. But, the optimal 
sharing proportion does exist, which not only correlatively helps the client maximize the saving 
guarantee amount at a certain risk level, but also motivates the ESCO to deliver the quality 
performance in the project. Here, we intend to work it out in the following sections and at the 
same time, understand the inner profit sharing relation changes according to the energy savings 
guarantee with actual data collected or simulated from the UMCP case.  
 
4.2 Pricing Model for UMCP Energy Cost Savings 
 
Theoretically, the energy cost savings guarantee could help decrease or eliminate risks that the 
verified energy cost savings may go down and may not achieve the predicted expectation, if 
there are appropriate proportions of extra profit sharing for the exceeding part of energy cost 
savings beyond the given guarantees. Analogous to the financial option situation, in the UMCP 
case, the annual guaranteed energy and operational cost savings of $1,904,343 is deemed as the 
Strike Price (X or K), which has already been fixed in the contract as the value through 
negotiations between UMCP and Johnson Controls. The estimated energy cost savings that have 
been specified in the financial analysis of contract are treated as the Spot Prices (S), which reflect 
the most accurate expectation for future possible energy and operational cost savings. Those 




know when they actually occur, and we need to monitor and measure them during the whole 
operation and maintenance period. Volatility (σ) causes the differences between the predicted 
and the verified energy cost savings, which come from both the future uncertainty of utility 
usage quantity and the constant changing energy price rate. Thus, as in the model, which has 
been discussed in Chapter 3, we need to take the portfolio energy unit price (PEt) and the total 
energy consumption savings quantity (Qt) into consideration.  Both of them apply to the GBM 
stochastic process and vary all the time.  
4.2.1 Energy Price Rate Model 
For the estimation of the portfolio energy unit price of the tth year (PEt), we adopted the energy 
price data from both the residential sector and commercial sector for the past 14 years from 1995 
to 2008. Figure 17 below shows the general trend of the building energy unit price from the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration of 2008. Detailed energy price information shall be found in 
Appendix I and Appendix II. 
 
Figure 17. Energy Unit Price and Expenditure for Building Sector from 1995 to 2008 
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Based on the data information, here, we assume the annual energy unit price growth rate (αE) and 
the volatility of the energy unit price rate (σE) stay constant each year in the following analysis 
for estimation in order to simplify the calculation process. Here, we use the logarithmic approach 
to calculate the volatility using the historical energy price rate and their corresponding 
logarithmic returns. Starting with a series of annual energy price rate, we convert them into 
relative returns. Then, we take the natural logarithms of these relative returns. The standard 
deviation of these natural logarithm returns is the volatility of the energy unit price rate used in a 
real options analysis. The volatility of both the residential sector and the commercial sector 
energy price rate estimation (σE) is then calculated as Equation (46) below as the sample standard 
deviations, where x represents the natural logarithm and the energy price rate and the footnote i 
stands for the ith year.  
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Table 4. Residential Sector Energy Price Rate and Their Logarithmic Return 
 
 (Prices in Dollars per Million Btu) 
Time Period Energy Price Rate Relative Proportion Natural Logarithm (x) 
1995 12.62 - - 
1996 12.72 1.007924 0.007893 
1997 13.29 1.044811 0.043836 
1998 13.47 1.013544 0.013453 
1999 13.18 0.978471 -0.02176 
2000 14.26 1.081942 0.078758 
2001 15.67 1.098878 0.09429 
2002 14.69 0.93746 -0.06458 
2003 15.85 1.078965 0.076003 
2004 17.06 1.076341 0.073567 
2005 19.2 1.12544 0.118174 
2006 21.54 1.121875 0.115001 
2007 21.62 1.003714 0.003707 
2008 23.14 1.070305 0.067944 
 




σE (Residential Sector) = 5.53% 
 
Table 5. Commercial Sector Energy Price Rate and Their Logarithmic Return 
 
 (Prices in Dollars per Million Btu) 
Time Period Energy Price Rate Relative Proportion Natural Logarithm (x) 
1995 12.63 - - 
1996 12.77 1.011085 0.011024 
1997 13.04 1.021143 0.020923 
1998 13.06 1.001534 0.001533 
1999 12.86 0.984686 -0.01543 
2000 13.92 1.082426 0.079205 
2001 15.56 1.117816 0.111377 
2002 14.67 0.942802 -0.0589 
2003 15.64 1.066121 0.064027 
2004 16.57 1.059463 0.057762 
2005 18.61 1.123114 0.116105 
2006 20.65 1.109618 0.104016 
2007 20.75 1.004843 0.004831 
2008 22.49 1.083855 0.080525 
 
(Source: U.S. EIA, State Energy Data 2008: Prices and Expenditures) 
σE (Commercial Sector) = 5.45% 
 
Through Table 4 and Table 5 above, we reached the energy unit price volatility of the residential 
sector (σE =5.53%), and the energy unit price volatility of the commercial sector, (σE =5.45%). 
Since the results of both sectors are very close, here, we simply deem their average as the general 
volatility of the energy unit price rate (σE = 5.5%) for the building sector estimation, which has 
been applied to the UMCP case.  
 
Based on the basic GBM formula of the portfolio energy unit price at the tth year (PEt) in 
Equation (26) and (27), we get the following Equation (47) and (48) for the estimation of the 

























α += +  (48)  
 
Also, we have reached the annual energy unit price growth rates for the residential sector (αEt = 
0.0482) and for the commercial sector (αEt = 0.0459), which we assumed to be constant. Here, 
we consider to adopt the general energy unit price growth rate for building sectors (αE =0.047) as 
the average of the residential and commercial sectors for the UMCP case.  
 
Based on the previous information, we use the portfolio energy unit price of the year 2008 (PE0 
=$22.82 per million Btu) for the estimation of the specific UMCP case. It is also the average 
energy unit price of the residential sector and the commercial sector in 2008. According to the 
10,000 times Monte-Carlo simulation, we reached the distributions of the energy unit price 
results for each year. Here the results for 2016 and 2021 are displayed in following Figure 18. 











4.2.2 Energy Savings Quantity Model 
 
We also consider the energy savings quantity for each year vary stochastically following GBM 
as is usually used in mathematical finance to model stock prices. Uncertainties in the future 
utility consumption amount has been considered. Associated with the first year prediction of the 
annual energy and operational cost savings (I1=$1,904,343), which has been specified in the 
contract, and the portfolio energy unit price of the year 2009 (PE1 =$23.88 per million Btu), the 
predicted energy savings quantity for the first year (Q1=79.75 billion Btu) has been reached, 
which plays as the initial value in the energy savings quantity model. 
 
It is usually very hard to collect historical data for the prediction of the energy savings quantity. 
Because different energy performance projects involves varied ECMs combination according to 
the buildings actual conditions and the possible length of the O&M period. However, the trends 
and specific energy savings amount for each year are foreseeable for the implementation 
engineers based on their intelligence and experience before signing the contract. Therefore, it is 
more reasonable and convenient to use the subjective estimation for the annual energy savings 
quantity at the tth year () associated with the specific project situations. In reality, the predicted 
annual energy quantity savings shall change year by year because of the nature of facilities 
performance. For instance, since all the ECMs have to be installed in some sequences that may 
delay the best performance for the renewed facilities at the very beginning of the project, the 
energy savings should demonstrate an increasing trend at the first few contract years. As time 
goes by, some ECMs may suffer deterioration or might not perform as well as before. As a result, 
the energy savings amount might decrease at the end. Figure 19 shows the subjective best 





Figure 19. Annual Energy Savings Quantity Trend for UMCP Case 
 
 
The evolution process of the project energy savings quantity is not exactly as same as the stock 
price in the financial market, which goes either up or down of memory less without barriers 
limitation. According to the EPC situation, the performance of the equipment and facilities 
installed in the building for energy savings should obey certain natural law and could be 
estimated in advance appropriately. Therefore, we assume the predicting energy savings quantity 
comes from the most accurate performance estimation associated with the recognized knowledge. 
The best annual energy savings quantity estimations have been considered as the inputs and are 
displayed in Table 6. 
Table 6. Annual Energy Savings Quantity Estimation for UMCP Case (Million Btu) 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 
79.75 85 87.5 89 88 87.75 87.5 87.25 86.9 86.5 86 85 82.25 
 
Based on the GBM process of Equation (28) discussed before, we derive the following Equation 
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σ ε= +  
(49)  







Since the volatility of the energy savings quantity (σQ) is dependent on the installed energy 
conservation performance, which varied from case to case, here we consider four scenarios 
(σQ=1%, σQ=5%, σQ=10% and σQ=20%) respectively. We run the simulation 10,000 times for 
each scenario. The correlations between the annual energy savings quantity for the tth year (Qt) 
and the (t+1)th year (Qt+1) have not been considered in this simulation.  
 
The distributions of the total energy savings quantity for the year 2016 and 2021 (σQ =1%) are 




Figure 20. Distribution of the Energy Quantity Saving of 2016 and 2021 
(σQ =1%) 
 
As the volatility of the energy savings quantity increases (σQ =5%), the frequency distributions of 






Figure 21. Distribution of the Energy Quantity Saving of 2016 and 2021 
(σQ =5%) 
 
The distributions of the energy savings quantity for each year (σQ =10%) are displayed in the 









The distributions of the energy savings quantity for each year (σQ =20%) are displayed in the 




Figure 23. Distribution of the Energy Quantity Saving of 2016 and 2021 
(σQ=20%) 
 
4.2.3 General Energy Savings Pricing Model 
 
In the general energy cost savings pricing model, the portfolio energy unit price at the tth year 
(PEt) also applies to the stochastic process as well as the total verified energy quantity savings (Qt) 
at the same year. In the UMCP case, we assume the portfolio energy unit price at the tth year (PEt) 
and the total verified energy quantity savings (Qt) are independent from each other.  
The distributions of the energy cost savings for each year (σQ =1%) are displayed in the 






Figure 24. Distribution of the Energy Cost Saving of 2016 and 2021 
(σQ=1%) 
 
The distributions of the energy cost savings for each year (σQ =5%) are displayed in the 
following Figure 25.  
  
 






The distributions of the energy cost savings for each year (σQ =10%) are displayed in the 
following Figure 26.  
 
 
Figure 26. Distribution of the Energy Cost Saving of 2016 and 2021 
(σQ=10%) 
 
The distributions of the energy cost savings for each year (σQ =20%) are displayed in the 
following Figure 27.  
 
 






4.3 Simulation Results 
 
Following discussions are primarily from Johnson Controls’ perspective since ESCOs have more 
controlling on the project and also afford the potential loss risks from the guarantee. Based on 
the energy cost savings model, following simulation results have been reached, when the 
volatility of the energy savings quantity is at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 20% level (σQ =1%, σQ =5%, 
σQ =10%, σQ =20%), respectively. The discount rate here is considered as 10% (r =10%). 
 
When the guaranteed annual energy savings stays constant (Gt = $1,904,343), the following 
inner-relations between the client’s proportion of the exceeding profit (α1) and the sum of the 












∑ ) are displayed in Figure 28. Here, we find that they 
are negatively linear correlated at the certain facility performance volatility levels, which means 
the more proportions of the extra energy savings profit shared to the clients, the less extra profit 
could be held by ESCOs. There is only one point which could help the sum of the ESCO’s extra 
profit stay at zero as Figure 28 shows. The Johnson Controls’ guarantee combination (Gt = 
$1,904,343; α1=100%) meets the requirements when the volatility of the energy savings quantity 
is at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level (σQ =1%, σQ =5%, σQ =10%). If the some innovation 
technologies have been adopted in the project, Johnson Controls could think to share 10% the 






Figure 28. Relations between the Clients Sharing Proportion and ESCO’s Extra Profit 
(Gt = $1,904,343) 
 
Here, we can conclude that for the UMCP case, given the Johnson Controls’ guarantee of 
$1,904,343 as the annual energy cost savings with the discount rate of 10%, the most competitive 
contract clause with minimum risk will be varied according to different facility reliability. From 
the linear relations between the client’s proportion of the exceeding profit (α1) and sum of the 












∑ ), when the volatility of the energy savings quantity 
is at the 1%, 5% and 10% level (σQ =1%, σQ =5%, σQ =10%), Johnson Controls has already 
reached the best guarantee contract which specifies as “if the energy savings were less than the 
guaranteed amount, Johnson Controls would pay the shortfall. And, if the savings went above the 
guarantee, UMCP would hold all the extra profit”. When the volatility of the energy savings 
quantity is at the 20% level (σQ =20%), the later guarantee part will change to “UMCP would 
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Also when the client’s proportion in the exceeding profit (α1=100%), Figure 29 displays the 















Figure 29. Relations between the Guarantee Amount and ESCO’s Extra Profit 
 
(α1=100%) 
We can conclude from Figure 29, given that the client holds all the extra profit beyond the 













∑ ) are negatively correlated. Also when the guarantee amount (Gt) stays at 
a low level, increasing of the guarantee amount (Gt) does not cause much effect on sum the 












∑ ). But as the guarantee amount going higher, the sum 












∑ ) decreases significantly. It would be very 
risky to increase the guaranteed saving amount when it is already at a high level and ESCOs 
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Based on the simulation result in Figure 28 and Figure 29 above, we can also reach the following 
Figure 30 which shows the inner relations between the energy savings guarantee amount (Gt) and 
the client’s proportion in the exceeding profit (α1). Similarly as the indifference curve in 
economics, each point on the curve here stands for a zero extra profit combination of the 
guaranteed saving amount (Gt) and the client extra profit proportion (α1) for ESCOs. This curve 
helps deliver the quality work with minimum potential financial risk. As far as we can see, there 
is no significant difference on the guarantee amount when the client extra profit proportion stays 
low. For instance, the possible guarantee amount that ESCOs could make stays around 
$2,500,000 when client extra profit proportion changes from 0% to 70%. However, increase of 
the client extra profit proportion at a high level such as 90% will significantly decrease the 
possible guarantee amount that Johnson Controls could make on the energy performance contract. 
For the UMCP case, the Johnson Controls’ guarantee combination (Gt = $1,904,343; α1=100%) 
fits the curve when the volatility of the energy savings quantity stays at 1% (σQ =1%).  
 











0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
Indifference Curve of the Guarantee Amount 
(Thousand) and the Client Extra Profit Proportion




However it shall be very risky if some innovative energy conservation measures have been 
installed since the facilities performance may not stay that stable. According to Figure 30 above, 
we recommend Johnson Controls to change the guarantee combination from (Gt = $1,904,343; 
α1=100%) to (Gt = $2,400,000; α1=65%), which not only reduces the equipment reliability effect 
risk, at the same time,  shows more competitive guarantee savings amount to the clients. 
 
When the guaranteed annual energy savings stays constant (Gt = $2,400,000), the following 
inner-relations between the client’s proportion of the exceeding profit (α1) and the sum of the 












∑ ) are displayed in Figure 31. The point which could 
help the sum of the ESCO’s extra profit stay at zero moves to when the clients’ extra profit 
proportion equals to 65%. The Johnson Controls’ guarantee combination (Gt = $2,400,000; 
α1=65%) meets the requirements when the volatility of the energy savings quantity is at the 1%, 
5%, 10% and 20% level (σQ =1%, σQ =5%, σQ =10%, σQ =20%).  
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Also when the client’s proportion in the exceeding profit (α1=65%), Figure 32 displays the inner 















Figure 32. Relations between the Guarantee Amount and ESCO’s Extra Profit 
 
We can conclude from Figure 32, the when the client’s proportion in the exceeding profit 
(α1=65%), the guarantee amount should be set when the ESCO’s extra profit equals to zero 
(Gt=$2,400,000).  
 
4.4 Case Discussion 
 
Compared with the financial option pricing model, two different stochastic models have been 
used for the evolution process analysis of the portfolio energy unit price of the tth year (PEt) and 
the total energy savings quantity at the tth year (Qt) based on their respective characteristic 
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comes from the project contract, the energy price report, Monte-Carlo simulation and the 
experienced engineers’ subjective judgment. 
We could also learn several things from the Johnson Controls and UMCP case study. The energy 
savings guarantee has changed the financial risks allocations in the energy performance contract. 
There are inner relations among the energy cost savings guarantee amount (Gt), the client extra 












∑ ), given certain ECMs 
reliability level. All of them are important parameters that ESCOs should consider when they 





Chapter 5: Conclusions  
5.1 Summary 
Climate change and energy supply concerns have led many state and national leaders to support 
an increasingly prominent role for energy efficiency in energy policy. It has become one of the 
quickest and cheapest ways to increase the amount of energy available for use. This research has 
discussed about the energy performance contracting (EPC) mode which is a popular building 
energy efficiency service that Energy Services Companies (ESCOs) use the stream of future 
utility cost savings to repay their initial renovation investments. The general ESCO market 
segments and industry structure have also been reviewed as well as the real option theory 
development in the literature review part. EPC helps the risk-avoided clients take charge of the 
large initial capital investment for the project construction and installation. A comprehensive set 
of Energy Conservation Measures (ECMs) is provided according to the project situation and a 
minimum amount of annual energy savings guarantee is usually specified in the contract.  
 
This thesis develops a systematic guarantee designing method for ESCOs to evaluate the 
potential financial risks, which comes from both the energy price volatility and the facility 
performance instability, during the decades of operation and maintenance period. Two types of 
energy savings guarantee models are identified according to their different risk factors and the 
guarantee underlying assets. The real option method has been adopted in order to analyze the 
evolution process with each influential parameter respectively and estimate the potential value of 
the energy savings guarantee.  
 
This research also conducts an EPC case study of the University of Maryland, College Park 
(UMCP) campus in order to show the application of the proposed model. It is an energy cost 
savings guarantee contract with a 13-year operation and maintenance period signed by the client 
UMCP and the ESCO Johnson Controls. Finally, recommendations have been given to the 
ESCOs when they plan to make the energy savings guarantee in the project contract base on their 




be taken into consideration. The balance contract will help ESCOs reasonably allocate the 
estimation financial risks with successful contract negotiation. 
5.2 Contribution of the Research 
The framework proposed in this thesis is generally applicable to the flexible guarantee design of 
the long-operation period performance contracting, not only limited to the energy efficiency area. 
Several contributions of this research have been summarized as follows. 
 
1. Identified the financial risk allocation changes that the energy savings guarantee has made in 
the energy performance contract. 
After the in-depth review of the EPC background information, the inner relations among the 
predicted energy savings, the verified energy savings and the guaranteed energy savings have 
been explored based on the corresponding selected ECMs for usage. Potential financial risks 
come from both the energy price volatility and the facility performance instability during the 
decades of operation and maintenance period. Two types of energy savings guarantee models are 
also identified according to their different risk factors with the varied underlying guarantee.  
 
2. Simulated the evolution processes for the possible annual energy savings amount from both 
the quantity and the cost perspectives. 
Volatility causations for the annual energy savings in EPC mainly come from both the energy 
price rate and the renovation facility performance instability. Here the Geometric Brownian 
Motion (GBM) is assumed in this study as the stochastic process to represent the evolution 
process of the annual energy savings volume and the energy price rate. Simulations have also 
been adopted for the future status estimation where the risk factors vary stochastically. 
 
3. Assisted ESCOs to develop optimal guarantee strategies in order to effectively mitigate the 
financial risk. 
Based on the stochastic process framed and the energy savings volatility identified, the amount 
of energy savings guarantee specified in the contract has very tight relations with several 
parameters such as the energy cost savings guarantee amount, the clients’ extra profit sharing 




should consider when they plan to make the energy savings guarantee in the project contract 
based on their completed feasibility estimation. 
 
5.3 Future Research Development 
Following are several important follow-on research directions:  
 How to compliment the stochastic model considering the possible correlations between 
the energy price rate, the energy consumption quantity and the O&M cost. More EPC 
cases and data collections are still needed to complete the model; 
 
 How to define the systematical inner relations among those parameters such as the energy 
cost savings guarantee amount, the clients’ extra profit sharing proportion, the ESCO’s 
extra profit and the ECMs reliability directly associated with motivational mechanism; 
 
 How to apply the guarantee risk allocation framework to other kind of performance 
contracting projects such as the BOT (Build-Operate-Transfer) infrastructure project 


















Kerosene LPG Total Wood 
Prices in Dollars per Million Btu 
1970 1.14 1.06 1.39 1.54 2.08 1.54 0.66 1.22 6.51 2.10 
1975 2.45 1.67 2.74 3.14 3.96 3.01 1.31 2.11 10.29 3.80 
1980 2.90 3.60 7.02 8.32 7.82 7.24 3.10 4.50 15.71 7.46 
1985 3.26 5.94 7.93 7.90 8.98 8.13 3.71 6.37 21.66 10.91 
1990 3.01 5.63 8.01 7.46 10.79 8.66 3.59 6.21 22.96 11.87 
1995 2.58 5.89 6.52 5.74 10.62 7.61 2.88 6.13 24.63 12.62 
1996 2.53 6.16 7.47 6.33 12.04 8.79 3.30 6.60 24.50 12.72 
1997 2.48 6.75 7.45 6.29 11.99 8.77 3.24 7.06 24.71 13.29 
1998 2.46 6.61 6.44 5.25 10.79 7.70 2.80 6.72 24.21 13.47 
1999 2.37 6.50 6.61 5.73 10.67 7.94 2.87 6.71 23.93 13.18 
2000 2.24 7.64 9.92 9.13 14.26 11.36 4.32 8.37 24.14 14.26 
2001 2.93 9.42 9.48 8.81 15.59 11.46 4.22 9.75 25.16 15.67 
2002 2.59 7.69 8.60 8.26 13.17 10.20 3.83 8.12 24.75 14.69 
2003 2.46 9.24 10.32 9.83 15.50 12.09 4.60 9.73 25.56 15.85 
2004 3.03 10.47 11.72 11.33 17.56 13.59 5.22 11.01 26.22 17.06 
2005 3.46 12.34 15.53 14.76 20.29 17.10 6.96 13.22 27.68 19.20 
2006 3.51 13.35 17.89 18.59 22.83 19.66 8.02 14.48 30.49 21.54 
2007 3.50 12.72 19.62 21.27 24.93 21.65 8.80 14.34 31.22 21.62 
2008 4.62 13.50 24.36 25.55 29.36 26.53 10.93 15.87 33.01 23.14 
 
Expenditures in Million Dollars 
1970 236 5,272 2,603 459 1,124 4,186 68 9,761 10,352 20,112 
1975 153 8,410 4,954 504 1,964 7,422 143 16,128 20,644 36,771 
1980 90 17,497 9,234 887 2,331 12,451 678 30,716 38,458 69,174 
1985 127 27,136 8,667 1,252 2,650 12,570 944 40,776 58,672 99,448 
1990 93 25,439 7,839 477 3,591 11,907 878 38,317 72,378 110,696 
1995 45 29,362 5,903 426 3,960 10,289 657 40,352 87,610 127,961 
1996 41 33,219 6,920 562 5,314 12,796 781 46,837 90,503 137,340 
1997 39 34,590 6,516 584 5,139 12,239 630 47,497 90,704 138,201 
1998 31 30,875 4,975 569 4,309 9,852 484 41,242 93,360 134,602 
1999 33 31,577 5,471 637 5,289 11,397 522 43,529 93,482 137,012 
2000 24 38,959 8,980 864 7,440 17,283 843 57,109 98,209 155,319 
2001 32 46,189 8,610 837 7,721 17,169 694 64,083 103,158 167,241 
2002 31 38,490 7,393 495 6,661 14,549 639 53,709 106,834 160,542 
2003 30 48,278 9,334 691 7,984 18,010 807 67,125 111,249 178,374 
2004 35 52,265 10,830 961 8,474 20,264 940 73,503 115,577 189,080 
2005 29 61,196 13,261 1,237 9,822 24,320 1,248 86,793 128,393 215,186 
2006 22 59,834 12,738 1,233 9,559 23,531 1,309 84,695 140,582 225,277 
2007 27 61,598 14,247 934 11,287 26,468 1,582 89,675 148,295 237,970 

























Prices in Dollars per Million Btu 
1970 0.44 0.75 1.10 0.77 1.26 2.86 0.45 0.91 0.66 0.80 6.09 1.97 
1975 1.31 1.32 2.42 2.32 2.62 4.66 1.91 2.40 1.31 1.68 10.11 4.07 
1980 1.53 3.32 6.45 6.46 5.19 9.77 4.12 5.64 3.10 4.01 16.06 7.83 
1985 1.77 5.34 6.33 8.18 9.43 9.01 4.50 6.50 3.71 5.54 21.30 11.64 
1990 1.64 4.70 5.97 7.31 9.29 9.15 3.41 6.07 3.02 4.94 21.20 11.88 
1995 1.55 4.94 4.70 5.55 9.42 9.40 3.14 5.18 2.25 4.85 22.29 12.63 
1996 1.51 5.26 5.63 6.40 10.75 10.28 3.75 6.23 2.47 5.30 22.17 12.77 
1997 1.51 5.67 5.28 6.18 10.97 10.01 3.27 6.16 2.43 5.59 22.03 13.04 
1998 1.51 5.38 4.15 4.88 9.95 8.73 2.38 5.14 2.09 5.20 21.48 13.06 
1999 1.51 5.22 4.65 5.33 9.71 9.45 2.69 5.62 1.89 5.15 21.01 12.86 
2000 1.45 6.56 7.48 8.87 12.70 11.94 4.49 8.36 2.99 6.75 21.52 13.92 
2001 1.57 8.32 6.70 8.38 13.72 11.50 4.06 7.96 3.22 8.05 22.99 15.56 
2002 1.63 6.49 6.21 8.14 11.20 10.81 4.08 7.23 2.81 6.47 22.81 14.67 
2003 1.59 8.07 7.62 9.80 13.23 12.26 5.30 8.71 3.48 8.01 23.54 15.64 
2004 1.84 9.19 9.58 11.41 15.37 14.44 5.26 10.27 3.54 9.14 23.95 16.57 
2005 2.25 10.98 13.63 14.96 17.95 17.86 7.48 13.68 4.67 11.19 25.40 18.61 
2006 2.37 11.60 15.74 18.73 20.11 20.20 8.69 16.09 4.72 12.14 27.72 20.65 
2007 2.47 10.98 17.24 21.13 22.19 21.94 9.71 17.73 5.54 11.87 28.27 20.75 
2008 2.84 11.89 23.85 25.57 26.26 25.46 13.19 23.31 6.58 13.48 30.38 22.49 
 
Expenditures in Million Dollars 
1970 72 1,844 646 47 177 247 323 1,440 1 3,358 7,319 10,678 
1975 191 3,385 1,423 114 329 415 939 3,219 3 6,799 16,157 22,956 
1980 179 8,858 3,337 262 438 1,046 2,325 7,409 17 16,463 30,611 47,074 
1985 243 13,368 3,995 268 842 866 1,025 6,996 22 20,633 50,092 70,725 
1990 203 12,681 3,199 87 898 1,018 785 5,986 104 18,979 60,627 79,605 
1995 181 15,383 2,250 123 967 170 445 3,956 106 19,625 72,481 92,605 
1996 181 17,106 2,717 135 1,239 273 515 4,879 127 22,293 74,121 96,414 
1997 195 18,755 2,344 152 1,244 428 363 4,531 125 23,606 77,153 100,758 
1998 151 16,667 1,778 152 1,102 340 203 3,575 99 20,492 78,999 99,492 
1999 154 16,351 2,038 143 1,283 269 197 3,931 104 20,539 79,141 99,681 
2000 125 21,339 3,672 263 1,796 532 411 6,674 155 28,294 85,129 113,423 
2001 139 25,879 3,404 263 1,844 430 284 6,225 145 32,388 93,402 125,790 
2002 143 20,926 2,758 130 1,485 488 326 5,187 146 26,402 93,763 120,164 
2003 132 26,411 3,668 183 1,964 735 589 7,137 188 33,868 96,263 130,132 
2004 189 29,518 4,506 234 2,203 645 644 8,233 209 38,148 100,546 138,694 
2005 215 33,838 6,098 323 2,226 817 866 10,331 258 44,642 110,522 155,164 
2006 153 33,736 6,314 284 2,327 984 654 10,563 262 44,714 122,914 167,628 
2007 174 34,005 6,620 194 2,522 1,342 732 11,410 305 45,894 128,903 174,797 




Appendix III.  Simulation Results of the Clients Extra Profit Proportion and Sum of ESCOs’ 
Extra Profit (Gt=$1,904.343) 
 
Alpha1 
ESCO Extra Profit 
(σQ = 1%) 
ESCO Extra Profit 
 (σQ = 5%) 
ESCO Extra Profit 
 (σQ = 10%) 
ESCO Extra Profit 
 (σQ = 20%) 
0% 4794.78 4932.62 5372.31 7272.62 
10% 4316.12 4438.49 4823.91 6478.68 
20% 3835.55 3946.24 4276.42 5658.05 
30% 3357.54 3453.1 3721.76 4902.75 
40% 2875.56 2951 3173.93 4076.94 
50% 2396.44 2464.9 2623.24 3264.3 
60% 1917.14 1966.19 2068.85 2491.35 
70% 1437.77 1474.72 1527.71 1699.31 
80% 957.95 982.6 978.49 888 
90% 478.13 487.26 425.46 103.19 




Appendix IV. Simulation Results of the Energy Cost Savings Guarantee and Sum of ESCOs’ 
Extra Profit (α1=100%) 
 
Guarantee amount 
ESCO Extra Profit 
 (σQ = 1%) 
ESCO Extra Profit 
 (σQ = 5%) 
ESCO Extra Profit 
 (σQ = 10%) 
ESCO Extra Profit 
 (σQ = 20%) 
0 0 0 0 0 
500 0 0 0 -0.49 
1000 0 0 -0.04 -26.37 
1500 0 0 -7.53 -222.86 
2000 -86.75 -106.52 -285.03 -955.61 
2500 -1063.93 -1248.55 -1706.78 -2615.5 
3000 -3357.79 -3577.77 -3991.48 -4810.7 
3500 -6546.06 -6635.86 -6833.47 -7390.06 
4000 -10093.14 -10014.12 -10017.8 -10262.43 
4500 -13641.14 -13520.83 -13347.21 -13230.54 

















(σQ = 1%) 
Guarantee Amount 
(σQ = 5%) 
Guarantee Amount 
(σQ = 10%) 
Guarantee Amount 
(σQ = 20%) 
0% 2579 2598 2661 2926 
10% 2559.5 2575 2627 2865 
20% 2537 2548 2586 2794 
30% 2512.5 2518.5 2546 2718 
40% 2484 2485 2501 2632 
50% 2451 2447 2448 2541 
60% 2411 2403 2386 2432 
70% 2361 2347 2313 2305 
80% 2294 2275 2219 2151 
90% 2187 2164 2085 1940 






Appendix VI.  Simulation Results of the Clients Extra Profit Proportion and Sum of ESCOs’ 
Extra Profit (Gt=$2,400) 
 
Alpha1 
ESCO Extra Profit 
(σQ = 1%) 
ESCO Extra Profit 
 (σQ = 5%) 
ESCO Extra Profit 
 (σQ = 10%) 
ESCO Extra Profit 
 (σQ = 20%) 
0% 1274.48 1416.58 1849.43 3785.57 
10% 1069.52 1183.95 1512.91 3151.67 
20% 865.35 942.79 1213.48 2545.94 
30% 659.32 715.39 887.63 1925.71 
40% 455.91 486.59 572.32 1357.06 
50% 255.26 241.01 252.6 731.93 
60% 48.98 19.21 -52.55 147.45 
70% -154.3 -225.26 -387.92 -409.91 
80% -358.08 -456.93 -700.44 -1044.78 
90% -561.55 -689.09 -1020.96 -1631.9 






Appendix VII. Simulation Results of the Energy Cost Savings Guarantee and Sum of 




ESCO Extra Profit 
 (σQ = 1%) 
ESCO Extra Profit 
 (σQ = 5%) 
ESCO Extra 
Profit 
 (σQ = 10%) 
ESCO Extra 
Profit 
 (σQ = 20%) 
0 6412.57 6457.93 6623.96 7278.57 
500 5168.52 5216.4 5368.79 6025.26 
1000 3926.48 3973.39 4130.43 4796.75 
1500 2683.12 2734.1 2882.82 3399.94 
2000 1382.72 1419.1 1452.89 1711.21 
2500 -494.53 -573.18 -706.61 -660.13 
3000 -3227.39 -3323.28 -3428.65 -3321.25 
3500 -6546.02 -6553.79 -6524.09 -6208.23 
4000 -10091.86 -9996.43 -9856.71 -9321.74 
4500 -13643.02 -13519.78 -13280.58 -12507.65 
















AEPCA The Australasian Energy Performance Contracting Association 
BOT Build-Operate-Transfer 
DFS Detailed Facility Study 
DOE Department of Energy 
DOT Department of Transportation 
ECM Energy Conservation Measure 
EOI Expressions of Interest 
EPC Energy Performance Contracting 
ESCO Energy Service Company 
ESPC Energy Savings Performance Contracting 
FEMP Federal Energy Management Program 
GBM Geometric Brownian Motion 
GHG Greenhouse Gas 
IPMVP 
International Performance Measurement and Verification 
Protocol 
IRR Internal Rate of Return 
LBNL Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory 
MUSH Municipal, University, School, Hospital 
M&V Measurement and Verification 
NPV Net Present Value 
O&M Operation and Maintenance 
ORNL Oak Ridge National Laboratory 
RFP Request For Proposal 
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